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Summary 
This report contains three separate papers, each addressing selected issues concerning 
natural gas policy and security of gas supply in Europe. The over-arching themes are vul-
nerability (to supply disruptions, to supplier pricing power) and fragmentation; and meas-
ures designed to overcome them, namely interconnection and consolidation of bargaining 
power. The first paper contains a review of some of the economic effects of, and subse-
quent  policy  reactions  to,  the  January  2009  cut  of  Russian  gas  supplies  through  the 
Ukraine Corridor, with a particular focus on Bulgaria and on EU policy. The second paper 
provides an analysis of the current state of gas relations between Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation, with a focus on the Ukrainian perspective and on recent political developments 
in that country. The third paper provides an analysis of the case for consolidating buyer 
power in line with the concept of an EU Gas Purchasing Agency. 
 
Paper 1: The 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas supply cut: economic effects and policy reactions 
 
The January 2009 gas supply cut was among the most severe energy security crises in 
recent European history. Bulgaria suffered significant economic losses. Industrial produc-
tion fell (in seasonally-adjusted terms) in line with the share of natural gas in the energy 
product mix in Bulgarian industry, namely 23% for the 14-day period of the cut. The econ-
omy-wide effect may have been in the order of 0.35% of yearly GDP, corresponding to a 
9.1% GDP shortfall for the 14-day period of the cut.  
However Bulgaria was rather an exception. Most EU Member States suffered no shortage 
at all in final domestic supply of natural gas. Redistribution between net importer countries 
played a more important role than increased imports from suppliers, while storage played a 
decisive role in several individual cases, as well as collectively. Imports from alternative 
sources were however an important alleviating factor, and the role of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) was particularly important: accounting for only around 10% of imports of gas in the 
OECD Europe region in 2008, LNG accounted for 24% of the short-term supply increase 
that was necessary to compensate for the shortfall in Russian supplies. This confirmed the 
‘swing supply’ potential of LNG and its very useful security of supply properties. 
A substantial response is gradually taking shape in Southeast Europe, primarily driven by 
EU co-financing as part of the European Union’s European Energy Programme for Recov-
ery (EEPR). Launched in 2009, the programme provides decisive levels of co-financing for 
a large number of gas interconnectors in Central and Southeast Europe. Two projects, the 
Hungary-Romania and Hungary-Croatia interconnectors, were completed before the end 
of  2010.  EEPR  co-financing  is  also  available  for  the  Romania-Bulgaria  and  Bulgaria-
Greece interconnector projects, making completion highly likely. A Bulgaria-Serbia inter-
connector also seems likely to materialise. 
The development of a comprehensive network of interconnectors across Southeast and 
Central Europe, in combination with potentially higher (future) LNG import capacity, effec-
tively leads to the creation of a ‘virtual pipeline system’ which contributes to several policy ii 
objectives, notably long-term supply source diversification and increased price competition 
and market integration. These benefits come in addition to a strongly improved resilience 
against supply disruptions. 
 
Paper 2: Ukrainian gas security after the January 2009 supply cut 
 
The new administration of President Viktor Yanukovych has proceeded with a comprehen-
sive revision of Russo-Ukrainian relations, culminating in the controversial ‘Kharkov Trea-
ties’ of April 2010, including notably an agreement to extend the presence of Russia’s 
Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory in exchange for a reduction in the price of imported 
gas. That arrangement has been variously interpreted, from a mortgaging of future inde-
pendence to a rational exchange in favour of concrete economic advantage. 
In domestic politics a drift towards authoritarianism is in evidence given selective prosecu-
tions of political rivals and pressures against the media. In foreign policy Ukraine seems to 
have re-aligned itself closer to the Russian Federation on a number of issues. Finally, 
Ukraine remains a highly corrupt society, while powerful oligarchs seem to benefit from 
comfortable relations with the new leadership. 
A question of practical relevance is to better understand the primary drivers for the behav-
iour of the new Ukrainian leadership. For this purpose we formulate four political hypothe-
ses which we then assess qualitatively, on the basis of selected test cases corresponding 
to political choices made in the course of 2010. The hypotheses, or behavioural models, 
are: national interest (realism), private interests (kleptocracy), ‘Russia first’ (‘unionism’), and 
‘Power first’ (authoritarianism). 
We find evidence in favour of all four hypotheses, suggesting (unsurprisingly) a mix of mo-
tives for recent political choices. However our assessment suggests a clear dominance of 
national interest (realism). The ‘Russia first’ hypothesis is found to be the weakest, while 
both the ‘private interests’ and ‘Power first’ hypotheses play important roles. 
Ukraine’s emerging energy policy seems more rational than suggested by the ‘Kharkov 
Treaties’ alone. Ukraine’s main external energy policy goals are to hold down gas import 
prices, to promote the continued (and if possible expanded) use of its infrastructure for 
transit of Russian gas to Europe, to encourage the cancellation of the South Stream pro-
ject, to secure foreign investment and assistance in upgrading its gas transmission system 
on the basis of a trilateral approach (EU-Russia-Ukraine), and to decrease its dependence 
on Russian imports by building an LNG terminal.  
Ukraine’s main domestic energy policy initiatives are to reform domestic gas prices and 
raise energy efficiency, to ensure the financial balance of Naftogaz without state subsidies, 
to reform the regulation of its domestic gas market in line with EU legislation, and to in-
crease the domestic production of natural gas in collaboration with foreign investors, in-
cluding Russia.  
From a policy perspective, some examples in our analysis suggest that conditionality on 
the part of the European Union could lead to concrete outcomes. Domestic gas price re-iii 
form, for instance, is driven at least in part by IMF conditionality, while regulatory reform is 
related to hopes of closer ties with (and investment from) the European Union. Beyond 
energy policy, Ukrainian hopes for a free-trade agreement and for an association agree-
ment open additional opportunities. 
Two fundamental issues in Russian-Ukrainian gas relations remain open. From the Rus-
sian side, an outright merger (de facto an acquisition) of Naftogaz remains the goal, some-
thing which the Ukrainian leadership is unlikely to accept. From the Ukrainian side, the 
cancellation of the South Stream project, at least as it is currently planned, combined with a 
commitment to raising transit volumes through Ukraine would be a major victory. However 
this vision depends on the success of the trilateral (EU-Russia-Ukraine) approach now 
being promoted by Ukraine for modernising its gas transmission system, as well as on 
longer-term EU gas demand patterns for which significant uncertainty prevails. Conversely, 
the interest of EU actors and of Russia in that project also depends on how committed they 
are to the South Stream project in its current form. 
 
Paper 3: The potential for an EU Gas Purchasing Agency 
 
The fragmentation of the EU’s natural gas markets and the essentially national approach 
taken by EU Member States in matters of external energy policy are being seen as in-
creasingly unsatisfactory. In that context, the uncovering of large gaps in import prices for 
Russian gas, notably between the Baltic States and Germany, have led to strong political 
demands for a consolidation of the bargaining power of EU importers.  
A notable development in this regard is the joint declaration of 5 May 2010 by the Presi-
dent of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek and former Commission President Jacques 
Delors on the need to create a European Energy Community. A component of the proposal 
is to “engage in coordinated energy purchasing, should the need arise”. Concretely the 
idea is to move towards coordinated buyer alliances and potentially towards the creation of 
an EU Gas Purchasing Agency. 
The analysis starts with a description of the theoretical model of bilateral bargaining devel-
oped by Tasneem Chipty and Christopher M. Snyder. The model assumes a monopoly 
supplier and a set of buyers who service separate downstream markets (e.g. regional or 
national monopoly distributors).The model is used to produce illustrative numerical simula-
tions of buyer alliances and their effects on the surplus (profit) functions of the buyers and 
of the supplier, and their effects on prices. The numerical simulations are based on (highly) 
stylised surplus functions for Gazprom and for an illustrative population of 62 small gas 
importers.  
The results of the simulation suggest that buyer alliances alone do not necessarily lead to 
a fall in price for all allied buyers, although they typically bring about a fall in the average 
price (provided certain assumptions are met). However, buyer alliances in combination 
with diversification of supply can lead to a fall in price for all alliance members. The positive 
effect of diversification experienced by one buyer can be de facto shared with buyers with iv 
no diversification through the introduction of a buyer alliance. On the other hand, buyer 
alliances typically lead to a loss of surplus (profits) for at least some alliance members, but 
not necessarily to losses for the supplier. 
A key question, therefore, concerns the exact role of public policy in terms of coordinating 
(and compensating) the interests of the various actors. If, as the simulations suggest, there 
are cases where a buyer alliance could be profitable for consumers in an isolated market 
due to lower prices but cause a loss of surplus for one of the buyers (or even all of them), 
then policy intervention would be required. It would not be sufficient to merely authorise 
alliances of buyers as they would not arise spontaneously. Instead it would be necessary 
to mandate buyer consolidation – for the benefit of consumers – and perhaps also to affect 
a partial compensation of the foregone profits for participating companies and their respec-
tive governments. The other important conclusion from the simulations is the critical role of 
diversification of supply sources, and the fact that part of the advantages of diversification 
can be, in effect, transmitted from a diversified market onto an isolated market through an 
alliance of buyers. One conclusion is that legislation on a possible EU Gas Purchasing 
Agency (and/or gas purchasing groups or consortia) should take into account the existing 
degree of diversification, and possibly encourage further diversification in specific cases, in 
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In January 2009, supplies of Russian gas from the Ukraine Corridor were completely cut 
off for a period of 14 days. It was the longest and most severe energy supply disruption 
experienced in Europe in recent history. Shortly after supplies resumed, the Bulgarian gov-
ernment reported an estimate of the cost of the cut to the Bulgarian economy of 250 million 
Euro, see RIA Novosti (2009).  
 
The first goal in this paper is to assess whether adverse impacts of the supply cut can be 
detected from macroeconomic or industry data, and if so, what the impact of the supply cut 
actually was in the countries it affected. Second, the extent to which affected countries 
were able to secure sufficient supplies from storage or from other sources will be analysed. 
Third, an analysis of the policy reactions at the national and EU levels is given, with a par-
ticular focus on Bulgaria, the EU Member State that was most affected by the supply cut. 
 
The January 2009 cut-off of gas supplies from Russia to Ukraine provides us with a natural 
experiment. The ultimate impact of the cut-off should be detectable from first quarter 2009 
data, or at least from January 2009 data, once other contemporaneous effects have been 
stripped out (notably the recession), and taking into account the different extent of the ac-
tual supply shortfall on a country-by-country basis.  The analysis therefore begins with a 
brief note concerning the 2009 recession. The supply cut is then described in more detail, 
and its impact on Bulgaria is estimated. The lack of severe shortages in other EU states is 
then highlighted with a discussion on storage and diversification. Actual and potential policy 
responses are then analysed and discussed. 
 
 
2. Economic background: the 2008-2009 recession 
Most economists trace the origins of the crisis back to unsustainable credit and housing 
market developments in the United States, see e.g. Sanfey (2010). Initially, many com-
mentators hoped that there would be ‘decoupling’ of growth between emerging markets 
and OECD countries. This was only partly the case, with growth continuing in China, India 
and several Asian and African countries. However the recession was severe across almost 
                                                            
1 Author contact information: Edward.Hunter.Christie@gmail.com  2 
all of Europe, with some Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) especially hard 
hit. However it is not the case that the CEECs as a whole were harder hit than Western 
Europe, indeed the opposite is the case. Moreover there is considerable heterogeneity in 
the region. Focusing on the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2010, 
as shown  in Figure 1, by far the  largest downturns  were observed  in the three Baltic 
States. At the opposite end of the distribution, Poland experienced positive growth over the 
period (almost 5% in real terms). Looking more broadly at the evolution of quarterly GDP, 
Figure 2 illustrates the substantial level of country heterogeneity mentioned above. One 
should note also the fact that different countries entered and exited the recession at differ-
ent  periods.  In  the  case  of  the  Baltic  States  the  recession  was  not  only  considerably 
deeper, but it also started earlier. Bulgaria, on the other hand, continued to grow strongly 
until the end of 2008, but the fall in real GDP it experienced in the first quarter of 2009 was 








Source: Eurostat quarterly national accounts, own calculations, based on quarterly GDP in national currency, chain-linked 
volumes, seasonally adjusted and adjusted for number of working days. A negative figure indicates real positive GDP growth. 
 
The oil price shock that culminated in July 2008 clearly played an important and somewhat 
overlooked role in precipitating the recession. IEA (2009a) states that the oil price increase 
played an ‘important albeit secondary role’. Hamilton (2009) finds that the oil price explains 







































































































made a partial contribution to the bursting of the US housing bubble, housing foreclosure 








Source: Eurostat quarterly national accounts, own calculations, based on quarterly GDP in national currency, chain-linked 
volumes, seasonally adjusted and adjusted for number of working days. 
 
The price of crude oil rose to its highest real level in history in mid-2008, around 140 
USD/barrel at current prices. As the import price of natural gas is tied to the prices of se-
lected petroleum products for most European countries, and given positive feedback ef-
fects onto the prices of other energy carriers, the entire energy import bill of most European 
countries rose strongly from 2000 to 2008. Particularly in the final part of that period, price 
increases were much too rapid to be offset by improvements in energy efficiency or by 
substitution effects, thus resulting in a negative income shock for net importers of energy, 
i.e. almost all European countries. That shock, which was substantial even when compar-
ing 2007 to 2008, can be estimated by computing the total energy import bill as a propor-
tion of GDP. The increase in that proportion between 2007 and 2008 is illustrated in Figure 























































































From a purely static point of view, the negative shock on the energy import bill should in-
stantly impact GDP in the same year. However evidence from past oil shocks indicates 
that the full effect of an energy price shock – so including indirect effects – takes several 
additional quarters to play itself out. Finally, one should note that most Western European 
countries were similarly affected on the basis of the metric presented here, and that there 









Source: UN Comtrade, Eurostat trade statistics, IMF, own calculations, based on net imports, SITC code 27 (all energy prod-
ucts), as share of current GDP; the average values from UN Comtrade and Eurostat were used. 
 
To conclude, the gas supply cut of January 2009 occurred in the context of an extremely 
steep downturn in economic activity across much of Europe. Energy price increases partly 
explain the beginning of the slow-down in economic activity, as well as the heightened 
macroeconomic and financial  vulnerabilities (higher current account deficits, lower con-
sumer confidence) that enabled further catastrophic developments. The 2008-2009 period 
is also characterised by high country heterogeneity. It is therefore within a complex and 





                                                            
2  Country  codes:  LT=Lithuania;  SI=Slovenia;  BA=Bosnia  and  Herzegovina;  RS=Serbia; 
LV=Latvia;  HR=Croatia;  CZ=Czech  Republic;  SK=Slovakia;  BG=Bulgaria;  MD=Moldova; 
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3. Anatomy of a shortfall 
The European Commission released a memo during the crisis outlining the severity of the 
crisis and available short-term responses for each affected Member State as well as for 
Members of the Energy Community, i.e. Southeast European countries. The contents of 
the memo are reproduced in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1 
Import shortfall and emergency responses, EU Member States  
 
Country  Import short-
fall  
Diversification  Gas storage  Alternative fuel 
Bulgaria  100%  no diversification  gas storage for 2-3 
days, covering 35% of 
gas demand 
alternative fuel for 
20 days 
Slovakia  97%  no diversification  gas storage for several 
weeks, covering 76% of 
gas demand 
alternative fuel for 
1 month 
Greece  80% (overland)  Only LNG terminal, 
fully capable, booked 
more ships 
Only in LNG terminal  One gas power 
plant switched to 
oil, sufficient till end 
of January 
Austria  66%  increased import from 
Norway and Germany 





71%  Increased import by 
8mcm from Norway, 
and via Yamal/ Ger-
many 
Gas from storage 
40days, 15% increase 
of domestic production 
Not used now, 
could be coal and 
oil 
Slovenia  50%  gas from Algeria via 
Italy, and from Austria, 
but not increased 
amount 
gas from storage in 
Austria till Monday then 
possible decrease of 
supply by another 20% 
Yes 
Hungary  45%  increased gas from 
Norway by 5% 
gas storage for 45 days  Alternative fuel –
crude 90days, fuel 
oil 30days 
Poland  33%  Half of the cut covered 
by Yamal, more gas 
from Norway 
gas storage for several 
weeks 
Yes 
Romania  34%  No diversification  Increased domestic 
production (60%) and 
withdrawal from storage 
Yes 




from Yamal, more from 
Norway and Nether-
lands 
Gas storage for several 
weeks 
Not used now 
Italy  25%  Increased import from 
Libya, Norway and 
Netherlands 
79% full, covers 50% of 
demand 
Not used now 
France  15%  Industry covered  80% full  Not used now 
 




Import shortfall and emergency responses, Energy Community countries  
 
Country  Import 
shortfall  
diversification  Gas storage  Alternative fuel 
Serbia  100%  12% renegotiated with 
HU 
1mcm, less than 1 day, 
8% covered by production 




100%  No diversification  No storage  Fuel oil only for 
20 days 
Macedonia  100%  No diversification  No storage  Fuel oil stocks 
need only for 
industry 
Croatia  40%  Diversification to Italy, 
but not used, negotia-
tions ongoing 
Increased domestic pro-
duction (43%) and sto-
rage withdrawal, 500mcm 
stored 




100%  No diversification  No storage  No alternative 
fuel 
 
Source: European Commission press release, dated 09/01/2009, Reference: MEMO/09/3 
 
Figure 4 




Source: IEA (2009b) 7 
As mentioned in Tables 1 and 2, additional LNG supplies were indeed forthcoming for 
Greece (and Turkey). Russia also immediately increased supplies through the Yamal pipe-
line (to Poland and Germany) as well as through Blue Stream (to Turkey). Other notable 
cross-border responses included reverse flow from the Czech Republic to Slovakia and (at 
the very end of the crisis) from Greece to Bulgaria, as well as deliveries from Hungary to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Serbia and from Germany to Croatia. An overview of these 
cross-border responses is shown in Figure 4. The impact of the supply cut on the domestic 
supply of natural gas depended on the size of the shortfall (itself a function of dependence 
on Russian gas and of dependence on the Ukraine Corridor) as well as on gas supply di-
versification possibilities and storage. This first layer of measures was sufficient in most EU 
Member States. To see this one may look at monthly natural gas consumption, see Figure 
5, which ranks selected EU countries (plus Croatia) by how large gas consumption was in 
January 2009 relative to the December 2008 level. If a country affected by the cut never-
theless consumed a normal level of natural gas, then it was evidently able to rely on stor-
age and/or other overland routes or LNG in sufficient quantities. 
 
Figure 5 





Source: Eurostat energy statistics, own calculations. 2008M12=100 for all countries. 
 
As January 2009 was a colder month than December 2008 in most of Europe, consump-
tion in the residential sector should have risen, pushing up total consumption levels in the 
process as can be seen from the data for the countries to the right-hand side of the distri-
                                                            
3  Country  codes:  BG=Bulgaria;  HR=Croatia;  SK=Slovakia;  IT=Italy;  HU=Hungary;  DE=Germany; 















bution. Conversely, consumption levels in Bulgaria (and to a lesser extent Croatia) suggest 
that there was a binding constraint on domestically-available supply. In a second step, the 
possibility of substituting to other energy products also provided important relief in many 
cases. After these variables are taken into account, one is left with the (initial or potential) 
level of demand that cannot be met, regardless of price, and rationing measures need to 
be taken. For the most affected countries of Southeast Europe rationing was used exten-
sively, with priority given to the residential sector while many industrial customers were 
disconnected. Kovacevic (2009) provides an assessment of these developments. 
 
4. The economic cost of the supply cut in Bulgaria 
While the cut-off was complete, it was of a relatively limited duration (14 days), so its eco-
nomic impact would probably only be clearly visible from January 2009 data, or 2009Q1 
data, rather than from 2009 annual data. The approach that was initially attempted was to 
focus on quarterly GDP data for a sample of European countries and to then test for the 
effect of the supply cut, having controlled for other contemporaneous factors. A regression 
analysis of quarterly GDP of European countries over 2008-2009 was carried out, account-
ing for initial differences in macroeconomic vulnerability (using the 2005-2007 average of 
the current account deficit), and stripping out the average GDP path using time period 
dummy variables. A possible additional effect from the earlier energy price shock was also 
taken into account. A gas shock variable was constructed and tested within this framework. 
However the results were inconclusive.  A more refined analysis of the transmission chan-
nels of the recession, as they affected each country, would be beyond the scope of this 
paper and was therefore not attempted. The alternative approach is to take a case-study 
approach, focusing on the most affected countries and using a combination of monthly 
data and self-reported losses. We focus on the clearest case, Bulgaria. 
A brief overview of the self-reported losses of Bulgarian companies is given in Tzvetkova 
(2009), citing Bulgarian government sources. Self-reported losses of the corporate sector 
reportedly amounted to 456 million Levs. Additional effects to the residential sector and to 
the  government  sector  (e.g.  loss  in  tax  revenues)  were  not  available.  As  a  result,  a 
rounded estimate of 500 million Levs (about 255 million euro) seems a plausible estimate. 
This figure should be interpreted as a loss of output (production). The corresponding loss 
of gross value added (ultimately GDP) should be somewhat lower. Seasonally-adjusted 
monthly data for industrial production confirms the sharp drop in activity that occurred in 
January 2009, see Figure 6. The fall was 10.6% as compared to December 2008, the 
sharpest fall in activity in more than 10 years
4. It was followed by a 0.6% rise in February, 
rather than by a more substantial ‘rebound’ that could have been expected. This suggests 
that demand-side factors brought production down by a similar magnitude in the course of 
the first quarter of 2009. That interpretation is supported by first orders data for manufactur-
ing production, see Figure 7. While the recession was clearly brewing during the second 
                                                            
4 Only the period from February 2000 to October 2010 was selected for analysis. 9 
half of 2008, the sharpest fall in orders happened immediately after the gas supply cut, in 
February 2009. If only demand factors mattered, one would expect the largest fall in orders 
in a long period to pre-date the largest fall in production, rather than the other way around. 
 
Figure 6 




Source: Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (seasonally adjusted data) 
 
Figure 7 






































































































































































































































































A more developed way of exploring this issue is to estimate a simplified monthly gas de-
mand function based on manufacturing orders, heating demand and prices
5. The compari-
son of the actual versus projected consumption levels shortly before, during, and shortly 
after the cut is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 
Actual versus projected monthly gas consumption, Bulgaria, Terajoules GCV  
 
 
Source: Eurostat energy statistics, own estimations 
 
The gap between the projected and actual levels of consumption for January 2009 is 30% 
(the largest gap over the sample). For the crisis period itself, this suggests that the gap (or 
share of unmet demand) was (31/14) x 0.3 = 66%. The economic value of the supply gap 
can be estimated using the average price for natural gas on Bulgaria’s domestic market. 
Using Eurostat data for the first half of 2009, taking the non-weighted average of mid-sized 
industrial  and  mid-sized  residential  customers,  one  finds  an  average  market  price  of 
23,110 BGN/TJ (all taxes included). Applying this price to the demand gap mentioned 
above yields a sum of 66.56 million Levs. This is the market value of unmet demand. This 
figure is lower than foregone production, since natural gas is only one of many intermedi-
ate goods and services used for production. 
Bulgaria extended production from the old Galata field that would otherwise have been 
closed, see Kovacevic (2009) and The Scotsman (2009). Also, Bulgaria was able to rely on 
some (limited) withdrawals from storage, and from some substitution in favour of heavy fuel 
oil. The lack of imports, although critical, did not therefore impact on GDP on a one-to-one 
                                                            
5 A simple time-series model was estimated over the period 2007M07 to 2009M12, regressing 
monthly  gross  inland  consumption  of  natural  gas  demand  on  the  half-yearly  average  price, 


































































































basis. However the Bulgarian authorities had to impose wide-ranging disconnections on 
industry in order to prioritise hospitals, schools and the residential sector, see Kovacevic 
(2009), Bloomberg (2009). The corresponding fall in industrial production discussed earlier 
is the result of that decision. The assumption we will therefore make is that the supply cut 
is responsible for the entire 10.6% fall in industrial production of January 2009 (as com-
pared to December 2008 in seasonally-adjusted terms). Using this assumption, we con-
clude that industrial production would have been 1/(1-0.106)=1.119 times higher than it 
was without the cut. According to national accounts data, GVA in industry was 2949 million 
Levs in the first quarter of 2009. Assuming for simplicity that January 2009 GVA in industry 
was one third of industry GVA for the quarter, namely 983 million Levs, and that the share 
of foregone GDP is equal to the share of foregone output, then foregone industry GVA is 
equivalent to 0.119 x 983 = 117 million Levs. As for the short-run impact, corresponding to 
the duration of the cut itself, it would amount to (31/14) x 10.6% = 23.5% for industrial pro-
duction. This proportion is in line with the natural gas intensity of industrial production in 
Bulgaria
6.  
Other losses are harder to estimate. There were certainly effects in other sectors besides 
industry, as well as lost revenues for the state. Organising fuel substitution efforts and at-
tempting to secure additional gas supplies led to costs as well. Finally, business and con-
sumer confidence were undoubtedly hit by the crisis, possibly leading to depressed de-
mand as the year progressed. For all these reasons, the estimates from self-reporting 
mentioned earlier seem plausible. Assuming then that the loss in output was indeed in the 
order of 500 million Levs, this would imply a loss of GDP of around 228 million Levs
7, or 
0.35% of 2009 GDP, around double the estimated loss based only on the fall in industrial 
production. Set against the duration of the crisis, a rough estimate of GDP loss amounts to 
(365/14) x 0.35 = 9.1% of period-GDP. 
 
5. Resilience variables: storage, diversification and LNG 
A remarkable outcome of the 2009 gas supply cut is how little effect it had on Central 
European countries. Most of those countries have a high dependence on Russian supplies 
through the Ukraine Corridor and could have been expected to fare badly. Storage played 
a key role notably for the Czech Republic, Italy and Austria. Figure 8 shows how withdraw-
als from storage compensated for lower net imports when comparing January 2008 to 
January 2009.  Diversity of supply sources is the other key variable that should help allevi-
ate supply cuts. In the case of the January 2009 crisis, the largest source of additional 
supplies was the re-routing of supplies from other net importer states, although increased 
supplies from producer states also played an important role. For example, Croatia was 
                                                            
6 Eurostat energy consumption data show that Bulgaria’s final consumption of energy in the 
industry sector in 2008 was 3539 thousands of tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe), of which 846 ktoe 
was due to natural gas, a proportion of 23.9%. 
7 According to Bulgarian GNI statistics, the ratio of  GDP to output  was 43.6% in  2008 and 
47.6% in 2009. The average of the two ratios was applied. 12 
able to rely on stop-gap supplies from Germany and France, but Libya refused to provide 
assistance, see Reuters (2009a), arguing that all of its supply capacity was “reserved”. On 
a more positive note, Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago all played a 
role in the month of the crisis, with in some cases very substantial temporary increases in 
exports. An overview of these short-run shifts in import patterns, comparing December 
2008 with January 2009 for imports into the OECD Europe region, is shown in Table 3. 
 
Figure 8 




Source: Eurostat energy statistics, own calculations. 
 
What these shifts highlight is the limited ability of some exporters to strongly increase sup-
ply at short notice, for instance Norway. On the other hand, redistribution of gas flows be-
tween OECD countries (excluding Norway) played a key role. Implicitly, part of that redis-
tribution had to rely on storage withdrawals in importing countries that were less affected or 
not affected by the cut in Russian supplies. This finding strengthens the case for adequate 
investment in storage facilities. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) accounted for an important 
share of additional supplies. LNG imports accounted for 10.5% of total OECD Europe im-
ports in December 2008, and for 12.6% in January 2009. More revealingly, if one com-
putes the import gap as the sum of all the individual decreases in imports shown in Table 
3, plus the rise in total imports, and if one then computes what proportion of the gap was 
covered by LNG imports, one finds a share of 24%. The additional supplies that came to 
















sively in the form of piped gas. The contribution of LNG to the additional external supplies, 
i.e. those from non-OECD countries, was even stronger. It was (unsurprisingly) 100% in 
the cases of Egypt, Qatar and Trinidad and Tobago, and 42% in the case of Algeria. Nor-
wegian LNG exports actually fell in January 2009, though this was slightly more than com-
pensated by the increase in piped gas exports. In sum, LNG accounted for around half of 
the increase in non-OECD imports in January 2009. These findings suggest a ‘swing sup-
ply’ capacity with very positive security of supply implications. 
 
Table 3 
Monthly gas imports by country of origin, Dec. 2008 and Jan. 2009 
 
Origin  Dec2008  Jan2009  Change (%)  Change (mcm) 
OECD excl. Norway  8245  10060  22.0%  1815 
Algeria  4244  5022  18.3%  778 
Egypt  481  861  79.0%  380 
Qatar  510  840  64.7%  330 
Norway  8533  8854  3.8%  321 
Trinidad and Tobago  659  938  42.3%  279 
Other Former USSR  418  490  17.2%  72 
Libya  1019  1032  1.3%  13 
Nigeria  768  685  -10.8%  -83 
Iran  426  329  -22.8%  -97 
Turkmenistan  302  85  -71.9%  -217 
Russia  11523  8756  -24.0%  -2767 
              
Other / Unknown (*)  2253  2387  5.9%  134 
Total Imports  39381  40339  2.4%  958 
  Memo: LNG  4117  5102  23.9%  985 
Source: IEA Natural Gas Monthly, own calculations. Reporter: OECD Europe. Units: millions of cubic metres (mcm). 
 
The conclusion is that storage withdrawals and redistribution of piped gas between Euro-
pean net importer countries, through interconnectors and reverse flow operation, played 
the most important roles in alleviating the effects of the crisis. However, increased external 
supplies also made an important contribution, notably in the form of LNG. These mecha-
nisms were sufficient to forestall gas shortages in most of the countries that suffered a drop 
in imports of Russian gas. However as outlined earlier, Bulgaria and some non-EU coun-
tries in Southeast Europe suffered substantial shortages given that the mechanisms de-
scribed above could not be activated to a sufficient degree. As a result, investments should 
be made in interconnection and reverse flow capabilities, as well as in higher storage ca-
pacity  and  higher  storage  withdrawal  capacity,  with  a  particular  focus  on  Southeast 
Europe. New LNG terminals and regasification facilities, or extensions of existing LNG fa-
cilities, should likewise be undertaken. These measures are those that would secure gas 
supplies in case of a short-term crisis under certain assumptions, notably that the duration 14 
of the cut is relatively short (e.g. a few weeks, not a permanent cut) and that there are no 
binding supply constraints with alternative supplier countries. In addition, and under the 
assumption that these measures could be insufficient in certain cases, dual-fuel capabili-
ties, security stockholdings of alternative fuels and corresponding contingency plans con-
stitute a second layer of measures that could be enhanced. Such preparations already 
exist in European countries and indeed were tested to their limits in Southeast European 
countries. These general conclusions are naturally in line with the common understanding 
in policy circles and in recent literature. For example, the European Commission identifies 
the development of the Southern Corridor and connections between Central and South-
east European countries (including the integration of the Baltic States) as gas infrastructure 
priorities, see European Commission (2010a). The interesting question is which invest-
ments should be prioritised and according to what criteria.  
 
6. Policy choices for increased energy system resilience 
The previous section concluded with a general “shopping list” of measures to increase 
resilience against short-term gas supply disruptions. One way to prioritise projects is to find 
a way of valuing their energy security benefits so as to be able to rank projects on the basis 
of a cost-benefit analysis. A general framework for this is the ‘security of supply cost curve’, 
a concept introduced in Lapuerta (2007) and applied to the case of Bulgaria in Silve and 
Noel (2010). The concept is illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 
Illustration of the security of supply cost curve 
 
Source: Silve and Noel (2010) 15 
 
The methodology consists in ranking investment projects by the unit cost of providing addi-
tional security of supply. In the case of natural gas, security of supply can be defined as the 
additional volume that can be made available (or substituted for) in time of crisis, and 
measured (for example) in millions of cubic metres per day. By ranking potential projects 
from the lowest to the highest unit cost, a cost curve is constructed. Because energy infra-
structure projects are typically “lumpy”, the cost curve will typically be a step function as 
shown in Figure 9. The practical application is that financial resources should go towards 
the lowest-cost projects first, and stop when a given (deemed sufficient) level of security of 
supply (the red line in Figure 9) has been reached or surpassed. Also, given that one will 
wish to ensure that demand is secured when it is highest, the cost curve should be defined 
against peak demand. The latter may be based on peak demand under the assumption of 
exceptional conditions. The European Union’s new legislation on security of gas supply, 
see European Union (2010), in force since December 2010, specifies that Member States 
should assume a representative crisis day that is “of exceptionally high gas demand occur-
ring with a statistical probability of once in 20 years”. In order to assess the unit cost for 
each proposed project, Silve and Noel (2010) compute the net present value of the cost of 
each project for supplying volume units of gas in case of a supply disruption. This enables 
them to rank concrete projects for the case of Bulgaria. They conclude that reverse flow 
capacities with Greece and Turkey, together with diesel backup facilities for heat genera-
tion, would achieve a satisfactory level of security at the lowest cost if supply disruptions 
are  assumed  to  be  relatively  infrequent.  In  a  more  pessimistic  scenario,  building  the 
(planned) interconnector with Romania is also part of the optimal solution. On the other 
hand they find that a planned expansion of the Chiren Underground Gas Storage facility is 
not desirable from the point of view of unit cost. One explanation the authors suggest is 
that focusing on reverse flow and interconnectors alone may be insufficient if neighbouring 
countries are suffering from substantial supply disruptions at the same time.  
Bulgaria’s gas policy priorities are in any case broader-based. In the absence of supply 
disruptions, in other words most of the time, the potential economic value of higher domes-
tic gas storage depends on the ability to use changes in stocks in order to exploit price 
differences across time as well as between markets. If interconnection investments are 
expected, cross-border gas trading would be assumed to develop and investment in stor-
age becomes more attractive. In addition Nabucco, South Stream and CNG (compressed 
natural gas) shipments from Georgia are all possible solutions for future supplies. A sym-
bolic illustration of this interconnected future for Bulgaria is given in Figure 10. 
In addition to heightened awareness about security of supply, the actual and potential 
availability of EU co-financing has also contributed to modifying perceptions in the region. 
The EU’s European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR), launched in 2009 as a re-
sponse to both the economic downturn and energy security needs, puts forward Union co-
financing for several projects which will affect Bulgaria and its neighbours. The Bulgaria-16 
Greece and Bulgaria-Romania interconnector projects are part of the selected projects, as 
are the Nabucco and Interconnector-Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) projects. In the wider re-
gion, Romania-Hungary, Hungary-Slovakia and Hungary-Croatia interconnectors are also 








Source: Simitchiev (2010). IGB, ITB, IBS and IBR refer to interconnectors between Bulgaria and Greece, Turkey, Serbia and 
Romania, respectively. UGS: Underground Gas Storage. 
 
If these interconnector projects materialise because they are deemed profitable by the cor-
responding investors given EU co-financing, the energy security benefits they bring would 
carry negligible additional costs. The capital costs (net of EU co-financing) and operating 
costs would be covered by revenues from commercial operations. Only the specific costs 
incurred during supply disruptions would remain, i.e. mainly the gas price differentials (as 
compared to the usual price of the missing supplies) may typically be larger in the event of 
a supply disruption where markets are more liberalised. 
Two further insights merit development. The first is that EU co-financing modifies the net 
present value calculations of energy security options. The second is that, in any case, a full 
NPV calculation must take into consideration the full economic benefits of projects, not only 17 
those that relate to security of supply. If an interconnector fulfils a useful function on the 
gas  market  by  enabling  arbitrage  between  national  markets,  then  proceeds  from  gas 
traded through it in periods without supply disruptions, i.e. almost all the time, should be 
counted as positive income streams.  
Concerning the first issue we take the example of the Bulgaria-Greece interconnector. 
Silve and Noel (2010) find an NPV of costs of 36.51 million euro per million cubic metre per 
day of secured supply, under a worst-case scenario of a 15-day supply disruption occur-
ring every year, and an NPV of 33.90 million euro per million cubic metre per day of se-
cured supply under a best-case scenario of one disruption every 10 years. Using the same 
assumptions, namely a time horizon of 20 years, a discount factor of 10%, OPEX of 0.37 
million euro per year, and additional fuel costs of 2.3 million euro for each incidence of a 
supply disruption, together with an assumed CAPEX of 230.28 million euro, we were able 
to reproduce the results of Silve and Noel (2010). EU co-financing for the Bulgaria-Greece 
interconnector may amount to up to 45 million euro, see European Commission (2010c). 
As for capital expenditure, Simitchiev (2010) mentions a lower estimate of 150 million euro. 
We will assume for simplicity that actual CAPEX will  be at the mid-point between the 
Simitchiev (2010) and Silve and Noel (2010) estimates, i.e. 190 million euro, and that EU 
co-financing is obtained in full. We will furthermore assume that this is equivalent, from the 
point of view of the project’s investors, to facing a CAPEX of 190 – 45 = 145 million euro, 
with all other assumptions held constant. In this case, NPV of costs for the two scenarios 
are 24.34 and 21.78 million euro per million cubic metre per day. The project remains a 
relatively expensive option – reverse flow NPV estimates are in a range of 0.65 to 5.61 
million euro per million cubic metre per day – however the impact of EU co-financing is 
substantial. 
The second issue, namely to account for the positive cash-flows of the interconnector pro-
jects, seems particularly useful. A direct estimate of these cash-flows is not simple. How-
ever a simplified approach is possible based on the concept of revealed preferences. As-
suming that the investors who proposed a given project actually carry it out, one can con-
struct a series of cash-flows that is consistent with the project breaking even. We assume 
an identical positive cash-flow every year, a 5% discount rate, a 30 year time horizon, 0.37 
million euro OPEX, 2.3 million euro extra fuel costs for each supply disruption incident, and 
the best-case scenario of one disruption every 10 years. We furthermore assume that EU 
co-financing is fully tapped into. In that case, the yearly positive cash-flow would have to be 
in a range of 7.3 to 12.2 million euro per year, corresponding to a possible range for 
CAPEX of 150 to 230 million euro. Assuming a discount rate of 10%, the range would be 
10.9 to 18.7 million euro. By implication, given a capacity of 7 mcm/day and assuming av-
erage  capacity  use  of  70%,  the  income  from  transporting  one  thousand  cubic  metres 
would need to be in a range of 5-11 euro. Price differences between national markets can 
be larger even than the high end of that range, suggesting that physical arbitrage could 
occur. Depending on the persistence of demand patterns in different markets the intercon-
nector could also more simply be used as a supply line, operating in a single direction for 18 
extended periods. In both cases the interconnector would therefore serve a useful eco-
nomic function in addition to enhancing security of supply. 
 
7. A virtual pipeline system in the making 
While many countries in the region have signed up to either the Nabucco or South Stream 
projects – in several cases to both projects – there is a growing realisation that the cheap-
est near-term option both for diversification of sources and for sourcing additional import 
volumes, at least from the point of view of capital costs, is to pursue a combination of 
cross-border interconnection capacity and increased LNG import capacity.  
 
Figure 11 
Map of the Energy Community’s Southeast Europe Gas Ring 
 
 
Source: Energy Community web-site 
 
As noted by Greek Development  Minister  Costis Hatzidakis, see  Reuters (2009b), the 
countries of the region “want to treat the Greek-Bulgarian, Bulgarian-Romanian and Ro-
manian-Hungarian pipelines as a single whole, as a single pipeline. Especially since all 
three separate pipelines are financed by the European Union.” EU co-financing is thus 19 
providing a strong impetus for the creation of what Tsakiris (2010a) describes as “the con-
struction of interconnector pipelines with LNG terminals into one virtual pipeline system”. 
The overlapping development of these many individual projects in and between Southeast 
Europe and Central Europe fit in with or enhance pre-existing regional visions, in particular 
the Southeast Europe Gas Ring concept put forward by the Energy Community, see Fig-
ure 11, and the New Europe Transmission System (NETS), see Figure 12. NETS is a 
partnership between Central and Southeast European gas transmission system operators, 
namely FGSZ (Hungary), Plinarco (Croatia), Transgaz (Romania) and BH-Gas (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina).  
 
Figure 12 
Map of the New Europe Transmission System (NETS) 
 
 
Source: NETS (2009) 
 
Socor (2010) interprets the list of approved interconnector projects covered by the EU’s 
EEPR programme as an extension of the NETS concept, while the Energy Community 
strongly endorses notably the Bulgaria-Serbia interconnector project as an important con-
tribution to the realisation of the Gas Ring concept. Recent developments are promising, 
see Tsakiris (2010b), Socor (2010). The Hungary-Romania interconnector has been built 
and was inaugurated on 14 October 2010. The Croatia-Hungary interconnector, also sup-20 
ported by the EU’s EEPR programme as well as by a €150 million loan from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), was completed in December 2010. The final agreement for the 
Bulgaria-Greece interconnector was signed in November 2010, with operations expected 
to start in early 2013. The Bulgarian government also stated its readiness to finalise an 
agreement with its partners concerning the Bulgaria-Romania interconnector. Both of these 
projects are eligible for EEPR funding. In addition, Bulgaria and Serbia signed a bilateral 
agreement for developing a Bulgaria-Serbia interconnector in March 2010. While that pro-
ject is not covered by the EEPR, other options for EU funding are being considered and 
the European Commission seems closely involved and highly supportive of the project. 
Some of the interconnector projects have already been completed or are already under 
construction, while signs are encouraging for most of the remaining ones. As these pro-
jects were mostly not expected to materialise before the decision to grant EU co-financing 
was made, it is clear that the projects are insufficiently profitable from the point of view of 
the private returns of some of the project partners
8, but that they are sufficiently profitable 
with EU co-financing. Moreover we would assume that the EU decisions are adequate 
from the point of view of social returns (meaning that the projects are economically justi-
fied). If this is the case, then the interconnector projects are a case of an economically 
sound policy at the EU level for overcoming the fragmentation that would persist if only 
national actors were involved. 
 
8. Conclusions 
The main lesson from the January 2009 gas supply cut was that countries with high stor-
age capacity and/or extensive connections to countries that had either high storage or al-
ternative suppliers fared well. Indeed the ultimate impact of the cut on domestic supply was 
non-existent in most of the countries that suffered a drop in import volumes. Bulgaria was 
the unhappy exception among EU countries. A combination of vulnerability factors meant 
that the cut led to a short-fall of around 30% of gas supply for the month of the crisis. It was 
estimated that the total GDP shortfall due to the cut was 0.35% of 2009 GDP, equivalent to 
a 9.1% GDP shortfall for the 14-day period of the disruption.  
Transforming the Bulgarian gas market from a vulnerable system into a resilient system 
can be achieved relatively cheaply thanks to investments in reverse flow capabilities, dual-
fuel capabilities and some (but not all) interconnector projects with neighbouring countries. 
A more ambitious option is being pursued by the Bulgarian government in collaboration 
with other countries in Southeast Europe, namely the construction of a comprehensive set 
of interconnectors in the region and with Central Europe. Economic benefits other than 
increased security of supply, combined with the impact of EU co-financing, explain why the 
set of chosen infrastructure investments differs from the lower-cost options that would be 
                                                            
8 For simplicity we refer to the returns accruing to the individual project partners as private re-
turns, even though many of them are state-owned energy companies. The broader notion of 
social returns in this section should be interpreted not as the social returns for the individual 
countries concerned, but for a broader region, or for the EU as a whole. 21 
required to deal only with short-lived supply cuts. The development of a comprehensive 
network  of  interconnectors  across  Southeast  and  Central  Europe,  in  combination  with 
higher (future) LNG imports, effectively leads to the creation of a virtual pipeline system 
which contributes to other policy objectives, notably long-term supply source diversification 
and increased price competition and market integration. These benefits come in addition to 


























Pavel K. Baev, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute (PRIO) 
Edward Hunter Christie
9, Research Partner, Pan-European Institute (PEI) 
Volodymyr Golovko, Centre for Political Analysis (Ukraine) 
 




The state of Ukraine’s energy relations with the Russian Federation is of key importance 
for the European Union. From the point of view of short-term risks, the breakdown of those 
relations led to the most severe gas supply crisis in European history when Russian sup-
plies through the Ukrainian Corridor were cut off for two weeks in January 2009. From the 
broader strategic point of view, Ukraine is the main transit country for Russian gas supplies 
to the European Union, and Ukraine’s relations with both the EU and Russia may ulti-
mately determine whether large potential infrastructure projects such as South Stream are 
built. Finally, Ukraine is also a large and important European state as well as an important 
market for natural gas in its own right. How Ukraine tackles its energy security challenges 
will, in any event, have an impact on EU affairs. In this context it seems vital to re-assess 
the state of Russo-Ukrainian energy relations  with a  particular focus  on  developments 
within Ukraine.  
Incoherent and muddled as Ukraine’s policy towards Russia remains at the start of 2011, 
there is hardly much doubt that import and transit of natural gas remains one of its crucial 
determinants. This major European state is among the worst affected by the economic 
crisis, and policy-making in Kiev is not just constrained by massive budget deficits but seri-
ously distorted by a looming state bankruptcy. Instead of translating a combination of na-
tional and corporate interests into a set of strategic goals, the leadership has to produce 
urgent and sometimes desperate responses to a permanent force majeure situation, and 
the government reshuffling in December 2010 was a consequence of this struggle. Presi-
dent Viktor Yanukovych, elected in February 2010 by a margin no greater than 4%, de-
serves credit for making Ukraine governable – against many expectations – but this nec-
essary enforcement of order on the unruly political arena has involved hard pressure on 
the  opposition  (including  criminal  charges  against  Yulia  Timoshenko)  and  exclusion  of 
many elite groups from state politics.  
Such concentration of power has brought justified criticism in the West about a retreat of 
democracy, and Yanukovych’s apparent readiness to improve relations with Russia has 
                                                            
9 Corresponding author. Contact information: Edward.Hunter.Christie@gmail.com  23 
amplified those
10. Setting a new pattern for the gas business is a central element of the 
new course, and the deal – struck already in April 2010 – on securing favourable prices for 
supply and transit of gas in exchange for extending the lease on the Sevastopol base for 
the Black Sea Fleet exemplifies the readiness to accept far-reaching long-term compro-
mises in exchange for (relatively) short-term advantages.  Yanukovych has firmly expelled 
many  stakeholders  from  decision-making  in  gas  policy,  which  nevertheless  remains  a 
product of bargaining between various interest groups, so that even Gazprom finds it diffi-
cult to understand the intricacies of this process.  
 
In this paper we attempt to make sense of Ukraine’s policies and motives with respect to 
natural gas supplies.  The analysis starts with a refresher on the development of Ukraine’s 
gas relations with the Russian Federation over the last few years (Sections 2 and 3). The 
core of the paper, Section 4, offers an applied political science approach towards identify-
ing the motives and drivers for the actions of the current Ukrainian leadership in its energy 
relationships with Russia and with the European Union. Section 5 gives an assessment of 
the most recent domestic and bilateral developments. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Russian Gas Price Surge of 2005-2009 
Political conflicts between Ukraine and Russia have accompanied a five-fold price increase 
for Russian gas imports into Ukraine, see table 1. Initially, according to the 2004 bilateral 
import contract, Ukraine received Russian gas imports in the context of a barter deal, as 
material remuneration for transit of gas to European markets. At the time, the implicit price 
of imports was estimated to be 50 USD per thousand cubic metre (USD/tcm) in 2004 and 
55 USD/tcm in 2005. The implicit transit fee was estimated at 1.09 USD/tcm per 100 km. In 
addition, Ukraine imported gas from Turkmenistan (transited through Russia’s transmission 
system, owned and controlled by Gazprom). In 2005 Kiev imported 23 billion cubic metres 
(bcm) of Russian gas and 35 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan, almost all of Turkmenistan’s 
Russia-bound export flow. Finally, Ukrainian companies produced around 20 bcm per year 
domestically. Formally this domestic production was destined solely for sales to the house-
hold sector and it fully covered that component of domestic demand. Implicitly, industrial 
consumption was related to imported natural gas. According to the 2004 agreement, the 
sale of gas from Turkmenistan to Ukraine was handled by a newly formed company called 
RosUkrEnergo. RosUkrEnergo was owned, on a parity basis, by OAO Gazprombank, the 
authorised bank of Gazprom, and a Ukrainian stake, handled by Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank, 
see Fredholm (2008). The Ukrainian stake was in fact held by two oligarchs, Dmytro Fir-
tash (45%) and Ivan Fursin (5%). In addition, the 2004 agreements foresaw an involve-
ment of Gazprom in the modernisation of Ukraine’s Gas Transmission System. One idea 
                                                            
10 Quality analyses of current political developments in Ukraine can be found in Sherr (2010), 
Valasek (2010) and Pifer (2010). The other question which is being raised is the extent to which 
Ukraine can remain a genuinely independent country if it continues on its current course. 24 
was to have an international consortium of gas companies, including Gazprom and Euro-
pean (notably German) gas companies, and of course Naftogaz, owning, operating and 
upgrading the infrastructure of the Ukraine Corridor. A parity-owned company was formed 
between Gazprom and Naftogaz, but no concrete projects were finalised, see Fredholm 
(2008). The Russian side always wanted much more, a substantial equity stake in the en-
tire system, and substantial control over it. 
 
Table 1 
Gas prices for Ukrainian customers, without tax, USD/tcm  
 











(1)  95  130  179.5  250 
(4)  305  248 
Industrial  cus-
tomers 









78  78  118 
 
Source: Naftogaz, media reports. Notes: (1): implicit price of barter deal; (2): Price cut due to Government Regulation; (3): Price 
changed due to fluctuation of exchange; (4): Average annual price. 
 
Far-reaching changes were tabled in 2005 by Ukraine’s then-new President Yushchenko. 
Yushchenko’s idea was to revise all of the 2004 agreements, excluding RosUkrEnergo as 
an intermediary and re-focusing the consortium between Naftogaz and Gazprom on new 
pipelines only, not on the existing transmission system. In exchange, Yushchenko pro-
posed a gradual transition from the existing regime to cash payments at European prices, 
see Stern (2006). Moscow seized the opportunity and demanded the full European price 
from 1 January 2006. There does not seem to have been any legal basis for the Russian 
side to have chosen that particular date. The 2004 agreements covered the period until 
2009 and the Ukrainian side had not unilaterally cancelled them, but only asked to re-
negotiate them. At first, Russia demanded a price of 160 USD/tcm, an abrupt three-fold 
increase. This would of course have immediately plunged Ukraine into severe economic 
difficulties.  Ukraine  naturally  refused  to  agree  to  those  terms.  The  Russian  side  then 
gradually ratcheted up the price, ultimately demanding 230 USD/tcm, a four-fold increase 
on the existing level, while simultaneously proposing that if that was too high, Ukraine 
could “pay” by transfers of ownership of Ukrainian assets. Ukraine of course refused again. 
While deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine hung in the balance, the Ukrainian side believed 
it could, in the worst case scenario, still rely on deliveries from Turkmenistan. An agree-
ment for 2006 deliveries was announced on 23 December 2005.  The Russian side then 
cornered Ukraine by buying off Turkmenistan for the bulk of its exports on 29 December 25 
2005, see RIA Novosti (2005). The stage was set for a complete shut-down of Ukraine’s 
gas imports. 
Vladimir Putin went on television on 31 December 2005 and issued a public ultimatum to 
Ukraine that it must accept the new price level, and that if it did, it would be delayed by 
three months, see Fredholm (2008). Given that both the terms and the form were unac-
ceptable, Ukraine refused. At that stage, the Ukrainian side had almost certainly underes-
timated the determination of the Russian side, all the way up to President Putin, to use 
coercion in order to obtain what it wanted. It is also interesting to note how deadlines could 
be shifted by the Russian side without any formal or legal basis. Russia cut gas supplies to 
Ukraine on 1 January 2006. The legal basis for Russia’s actions seems very weak. Sup-
porters of the Russian side, e.g. Stern (2006), have suggested that Ukraine “started the 
revision” of the 2004 agreement and use the fact that Ukraine took no legal action against 
Russia as evidence for that view. However these arguments fail to consider how states 
(and individuals) behave when they are in a relationship of dependence with a considera-
bly stronger counterpart. 
Rapid  and  intense  negotiations  ensued  as  soon  as  the  deliveries  had  been  cut.  The 
Ukrainian side caved in under the pressure. They needed a rapid resumption of deliveries 
and it was the middle of winter. Gas exports from Russia would, from then on, be sold not 
directly to the Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz, but to the dubious Russo-Ukrainian inter-
mediary, RosUkrEnergo. The price of natural gas sold by Gazprom to RosUkrEnergo rose, 
officially at least, to 230 USD/tcm. However RosUkrEnergo would “mix” that with gas from 
Turkmenistan (now strangely available), purchased at a much lower price. The result was 
an average price of 95 USD/tcm for 2006 and was thus a price that the Ukrainian economy 
could perhaps cope with. The 2006 agreement was applied from 2006 to 2008. However 
the import price for Ukraine grew substantially in 2007 and in 2008 as the “export price” of 
Central Asian gas rose. During that period, RosUkrEnergo remained the single intermedi-
ary in Russian-Ukrainian gas trade. In effect, RosUkrEnergo was a vehicle for monopolis-
ing Ukraine’s gas imports as it controlled the gas from both sources of imports, Russia and 
Turkmenistan. But this was not all. The other two main consequences of the 2006 agree-
ment were that Naftogaz would be banned from re-exporting any surplus gas to Europe, 
and the second was the creation of a company called UkrGazEnergo, a 50-50 joint venture 
between Naftogaz and RosUkrEnergo which was licensed to supply the Ukrainian domes-
tic market. Implicitly, Gazprom obtained a participation of 25% in a gas distribution com-
pany on the Ukrainian market. In compliance with the agreement, UkrGazEnergo was rap-
idly licensed to distribute gas to an increasing share of industrial customers. With its mar-
gins trimmed by RosUkrEnergo on the import side and by UkrGazEnergo on the distribu-
tion side, Naftogaz suffered from rapidly worsening finances. 
 
The 2008-2009 conflict which culminated in the disastrous shut-down of the Ukraine Corri-
dor in January 2009 can be partly attributed to a conflict between the Ukrainian govern-
ment and the intermediary RosUkrEnergo. Ukraine’s Prime Minister at the time, Yulia Ty-26 
moshenko, wished to remove RosUkrEnergo from the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade. At the 
time, as well as more recently, Tymoshenko has accused RosUkrEnergo not only of mak-
ing a mess of the gas trade with Russia, but also of serving as a slush fund for certain 
Ukrainian political leaders – a view endorsed notably by Aslund (2009) – and of having 
links with criminal elements.  
As in the 2005-2006 dispute, Russian negotiators adopted harsh negotiating tactics, mak-
ing last-minute demands for immediate payments of large debts and fines for late pay-
ments, and raising the proposed export price by substantial amounts in the final weeks 
before 31 December 2008. In the final days before the deadline one had the clear impres-
sion that the Russian side wanted the negotiations to fail – and that the timing (winter) was, 
as in 2005-2006, due to a deliberate selection of a period of higher vulnerability. In parallel, 
the complexity of the relations between the Kremlin, Gazprom, RosUkrEnergo, Naftogaz, 
the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian President were difficult to disentangle for most 
observers as many confusing and conflicting statements were made, for instance of pay-
ments being made but not received. Of course, the fact that RosUkrEnergo is 50% con-
trolled by Gazprom should not be forgotten. 
After two weeks of suspended gas supplies (and furious reactions from across Europe), 
Ukraine and Russia signed a contract for the period 2009-2019, introducing a new pricing 
formula very similar to what is in force for Russian exports to EU countries. The gas export 
price is automatically adjusted every quarter in line with the (lagged) development of gasoil 
and fuel oil prices. The formula implies gas prices for Ukraine that are slightly higher than 
those paid by Germany. A minor concession was however made by applying a temporary 
20% discount on the formula price for the year 2009. The exclusion of RosUkrEnergo was 
also confirmed with that agreement, so that all Ukrainian imports after January 2009 are, 
formally speaking, of “Russian gas” and handled by Gazprom. 
Gas prices on Ukraine’s domestic market followed separate paths. From the end of 2008, 
gas prices for Ukrainian industrial customers were subsidised for chemical and metallurgi-
cal plants with the aim of supporting them in the economic downturn. That price is calcu-
lated based on a notional fixed cost of imported gas of 230 USD/tcm, plus costs of trans-
portation inside the country.  Gas prices for households didn’t have a direct correlation with 
changes in the Russian gas price. For electoral reasons, in view of the March 2006, Sep-
tember 2007 and planned (but abandoned) December 2008 parliamentary elections, as 
well as due to the January 2010 Presidential elections, Ukraine’s successive heads of 
government repeatedly avoided imposing significant increases on residential gas prices. 
Uncompensated price subsidies are one component of the financial difficulties experienced 
by  Naftogaz.  However  one  should  add  the  problem  of  non-compliance  (non-payment) 
which, to some degree, was always present in Ukraine. In addition, as mentioned earlier, 
Naftogaz was squeezed between RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo, experiencing limited 
access to its own market and reduced margins in general.  
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From  the  economic  perspective,  external  economic  conditions  worsened  in  2008  and 
2009, leading to a slowdown in 2008 and a disastrous -15% in GDP in 2009. From a struc-
tural perspective, the Ukrainian economy has been dependent on moderate natural gas 
prices to support the manufacturing of its main export commodities: iron and steel ac-
counted for almost 40% of total goods exports over 2005-2008. Rising energy import costs 
contributed to the country’s pre-crisis vulnerabilities. Based on UN COMTRADE statistics, 
the total energy import bill (all energy products) rose from 8.5% to 10.4% of GDP between 
2005 and 2008. However this explains only a fraction of the rise in the current account 
deficit, see Table 2. Ukraine was on an unsustainable path from the macroeconomic per-
spective,  with  signs  of  overheating  and  sharp  increases  in  consumption  and  imports. 
Ukraine was then strongly affected by the global recession through the trade channel, with 




Ukraine: selected macroeconomic indicators 2005-2011 
 
   2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010e  2011f 
Real GDP growth (%)  2.7  7.3  7.9  2.1  -15.1  3.7  4.5 
Average inflation rate (%)  13.5  9.1  12.8  25.2  15.9  9.8  10.8 
General government net debt (% of GDP)  13.1  11.1  9.6  18.4  33.6  38.6  39.8 
Current account balance (% of GDP)  2.9  -1.5  -3.7  -7.1  -1.5  -0.4  -1.3 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010. 
 
 
3. Developments under the Yanukovych Presidency 
A major re-alignment in Ukraine’s energy and foreign policies developed rapidly in the 
course of 2010. Fragile economically, politically fractious and highly dependent on Russian 
energy supplies and Russian good-will, Ukraine was going to have to take some difficult 
decisions. One clear threat to Ukrainian economic interests was the looming possibility of 
losing transit fees and other related revenues from the transiting of Russian gas to Europe 
due to the construction of a set of Russian bypass or “transit avoidance” pipelines. If Nord 
Stream and South Stream were to exist and operate at their full design capacities, transit 
through Ukraine could fall to zero as soon as 2015 and remain at only very low levels 
thereafter, see Figure 1. Another key challenge was the high price level for imported Rus-






Russian gas exports and supply corridor capacities to Europe (including Turkey)
 
Source: IEA (2009: 470) 
 
 
In a sense, the new Ukrainian government decided to aim high. Its most important foreign 
energy policy goals were as follows:
 
·  Revise the Timoshenko
annual gas prices, if possible down to 220
around 330 USD/tcm);
·  Increase the volume of Russian gas transiting through Ukraine;
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projects that could negatively affect Ukrainian transit.
 
In the beginning, the new Ukrainian negotiation team felt some kind of euphoria. Official 
Kiev assumed that Moscow would change its energy policy toward Ukraine due to
Russian orientation of Yanukovych (“pro
main proposal of the Ukrainians was to restore the project of an international consortium 
for running the Ukrainian Gas Transmission System (GTS). But this seem
attractive to Russia, because Gazprom had already moved forward in developing altern
tive gas pipeline projects bypassing Ukraine. If these projects were completed, the Ru
sians had reasoned, they would anyway be able to influence the Ukrai
tion strategy without direct control of Ukraine’s GTS, and would in any case have almost no 
need for it. In another interpretation, the South Stream project in particular is a credible 
strategic threat to Ukrainian transit which the Russ
can extract valuable concessions from Ukraine. This shift in Russia’s (apparent) bargaining 
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In a sense, the new Ukrainian government decided to aim high. Its most important foreign 
energy policy goals were as follows: 
Revise the Timoshenko-Putin 2009 agreement in order to decrease the average 
annual gas prices, if possible down to 220-230 USD/tcm (from forecast levels of 
around 330 USD/tcm); 
Increase the volume of Russian gas transiting through Ukraine; 
Stop the implementation of the South Stream project and of other Russian bypass 
projects that could negatively affect Ukrainian transit. 
In the beginning, the new Ukrainian negotiation team felt some kind of euphoria. Official 
Kiev assumed that Moscow would change its energy policy toward Ukraine due to
Russian orientation of Yanukovych (“pro-Russian” in the Ukrainian public opinion). The 
main proposal of the Ukrainians was to restore the project of an international consortium 
for running the Ukrainian Gas Transmission System (GTS). But this seem
attractive to Russia, because Gazprom had already moved forward in developing altern
tive gas pipeline projects bypassing Ukraine. If these projects were completed, the Ru
sians had reasoned, they would anyway be able to influence the Ukrainian gas transport
tion strategy without direct control of Ukraine’s GTS, and would in any case have almost no 
need for it. In another interpretation, the South Stream project in particular is a credible 
strategic threat to Ukrainian transit which the Russian side is unlikely to drop unless they 
can extract valuable concessions from Ukraine. This shift in Russia’s (apparent) bargaining 
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In a sense, the new Ukrainian government decided to aim high. Its most important foreign 
agreement in order to decrease the average 
230 USD/tcm (from forecast levels of 
ct and of other Russian bypass 
In the beginning, the new Ukrainian negotiation team felt some kind of euphoria. Official 
Kiev assumed that Moscow would change its energy policy toward Ukraine due to the pro-
Russian” in the Ukrainian public opinion). The 
main proposal of the Ukrainians was to restore the project of an international consortium 
for running the Ukrainian Gas Transmission System (GTS). But this seemed no longer so 
attractive to Russia, because Gazprom had already moved forward in developing alterna-
tive gas pipeline projects bypassing Ukraine. If these projects were completed, the Rus-
nian gas transporta-
tion strategy without direct control of Ukraine’s GTS, and would in any case have almost no 
need for it. In another interpretation, the South Stream project in particular is a credible 
ian side is unlikely to drop unless they 
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power is the main reason why the Ukrainian side felt forced to propose political conces-
sions. This process led to the Medvedev-Yanukovych “Kharkov treaties” in April 2010. 
 According to the 2nd article of the “Treaty on the residence of the Black Sea Fleet of the 
Russian Federation on Ukrainian territory”, the Russian fleet will extend its presence on the 
Crimean peninsula until 2042, as opposed to the earlier deadline of 2017, in exchange for 
a  gas  price  discount.  If  the  formula  price  is  above  333  USD/tcm,  the  discount  is  100 
USD/tcm, whereas if the formula price is below 333 USD/tcm, the discount is 30%. But 
there is one important condition: the discount, valid until 2019, is rendered as a debt of 
Ukraine to Russia which is to be paid off by granting the additional 25 years of presence of 
the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. 
Synchronously to the Black Sea fleet treaty, Gazprom and Naftogaz signed an Addendum 
(Appendix) to the 2009 gas supply contract specifying the following: 
 
·  The companies refuse to use punitive measures against each other; 
·  Ukraine increases its purchases of Russian gas up to 36.5 bcm per year; 
·  Gazprom shall settle 80% of the transit fees no later than the 6th day of the month 
immediately following transit, and the remaining 20% no later than the 20th day of 
that month (the latter was the old deadline for the entire payment); 
·  The discount on the formula price shall be not more than 100 USD/tcm and comes 
in the form of a decrease in Russian export duties. The discount applies for a 
maximum volume of 30 bcm in 2010 and for a maximum volume of 40 bcm per 
year thereafter; 
 
The Russian gas price decrease has mostly not been passed through to end-use prices: 
the fall for industrial customers was about 3 USD/tcm – from 255 to 252 USD/tcm. Nafto-
gaz gains from these new agreements as it is now in a position to cash in reasonable profit 
margins. This allows the company to improve its hitherto fragile financial situation. In addi-
tion, Naftogaz increased residential gas prices by 50% in August 2010. Further increases 
should occur in line with IMF-approved reforms until domestic prices reach “import parity”, 
an explicit goal of the reforms being to ensure a sound financial framework for Naftogaz 
and steady improvements in energy efficiency in the country as a whole. On this issue, the 
Ukrainian leadership is at risk of a popular backlash if it raises prices too much too fast, 
while international financial institutions have a history of encouraging rapid price reforms 
without taking sufficiently into consideration the risk of rising non-payment and theft. The 
need for the reform is unquestionable, but the key question is the pace. 
Although the gas question was at the centre of the “reset” of Ukrainian-Russian relations a 
number of other agreements were also made.  First of all, the Ukrainian side tried to “sell” 
to Russia its new policy of non-integration into NATO. This was not deemed sufficiently 
attractive, however. The Russian side was disappointed that a “no-block” election pledge 
had been made by Yanukovych, thus ruling out Ukrainian membership of the Russian-led 30 
military alliance in the former Soviet space, the CSTO. However other integrative meas-
ures were undertaken from the economic viewpoint: 
 
·  Integration with Russian (state-run) companies in the nuclear industry at the ex-
pense of collaboration with Western companies; 
·  Russian capital expansion in the Ukrainian bank sector; 
·  Partial Merger in the aviation industry with the creation of a joint venture  between 
Antonov  (Ukraine)  corporation  and  Russian  United  Aircraft  Corporation  (OAK) 
(Russia); 
 
There have also been rumours concerning a possible “list of Putin” enumerating Ukrainian 
private and public companies that Putin proposed should be controlled by Russia. No con-
firmation of the existence of such a list has been found, although the rumour is not implau-
sible. If it is only a rumour, then at the very least it reveals current perceptions about the 
direction of bilateral relations. Finally, the Kharkov treaties leave open a number of points 
which the Ukrainian side would find very favourable: 
 
·  Renunciation of the ‘take-or-pay’ clause in bilateral gas agreements, or if it kept, 
then the introduction of an analogous clause on transit, ‘pump or pay’, in case tran-
sit volumes are lower than contracted; 
·  Revision of the gas pricing formula specified in the 2009 supply contract. Besides 
the high base level implied by the formula, Naftogaz would prefer it if the link to  
gasoil and fuel oil prices were dropped; 
·  Full restoration of cooperation in the defence and machine-building industries; 
·  Settlement of the border demarcation in the Azov Sea and in the Kerch Channel. 
 
Possibility of a merger between Gazprom and Naftogaz 
One the most discussed part of the Ukrainian-Russian gas negotiation is the format of a 
possible merger between Gazprom and Naftogaz. Initially this seemed to be an impromptu 
idea of Putin at a joint press conference with Prime Minister Azarov in April 2010. Given 
the large difference in market valuation between the companies, the Ukrainian side rapidly 
concluded that Ukraine would be merely a minority shareholder in the merged company, 
and that such a merger would satisfy all of Russia’s key demands while offering very little 
of value to Ukraine in return. Following Ukraine’s refusal Moscow continued to propose 
some form of full integration, at times switching to more aggressive bargaining rhetoric. In 
August 2010 Putin stated that Ukraine had been given too big a discount on the price of 
gas, and that it should therefore not try to obtain any new concessions. From Autumn 2010 
the pressure intensified. According to Ukrainian government officials, Russia threatened to 
stop negotiations about a Russian participation in the modernisation of the Ukrainian GTS. 
On the other hand, Russia also suggested that a merger between Naftogaz and Gazprom 
would mean the currently lower Russian domestic gas prices for Ukrainian customers, and 31 
also  that  Russia  would  consider  decreasing  the  capacity  of  the  South  Stream  project. 
Other paths towards uniting Gazprom and Naftogaz were also explored. A notable one 
was to proceed with asset swaps. Ukraine was interested in this possibility, and hoped to 
obtain ownership of gas deposits in Russia with a production flow of 30 bcm per year, 
equivalent to Ukraine’s demand for Russian-produced gas.  
In response Moscow proposed some deposits on the Yamal Peninsula as well as part of 
the Astrakhan deposit. However in both cases particularly high up-front costs were a draw-
back. In addition the Astrakhan deposit has high sulphur content, which was why other 
foreign investors (ENI and Total) had previously decided not to invest there. Ukraine stood 
firm, asking for access to commercially more favourable deposits in the Urengoy gas field. 
In  exchange,  Ukraine  proposed  joint  exploration  of  the  ‘Palasa  structure’  on  Ukraine’s 
Black Sea shelf, as well as joint development of non-conventional gas in Ukraine. As a 
result and as a first step, Ukraine and Russia declared the creation of two joint ventures in 
November 2010 for developing Ukrainian resources, the first for the Palasa structure (esti-
mated reserves of 1000 bcm), the second for development of shale gas and coal-bed 
methane. A memorandum to that effect was duly signed on 22 December 2010. The ques-
tion of the “main” joint venture was left open. Component assets of Ukraine’s GTS are po-
tentially on the table, e.g. underground storage facilities. In exchange, Russia could con-
sent to swaps with deposits in Russia (though most likely not in the Urengoy field), or to 
further  cuts  in  the  export  price  and  to  commitments  to  higher  transit  volumes  through 
Ukraine. Another area of negotiation was the idea to lease Ukrainian underground storage 
facilities to an international consortium of which Gazprom would be a member. The main 
lobbyist for this idea from the Russian side was the manager of Gazpromsbyt Ukraine, 
Anatoly Podmyshalsky.  
Conversely, Ukraine’s energy Minister, Yuri Boyko, proposed the construction of gas stor-
age facilities in Eastern Ukraine. Currently, Ukraine’s (substantial) gas storage capacity is 
mainly in Western Ukraine. Supplying all of the Eastern regions from Ukrainian storage in 
case of a full cut in Russian imports would require operating large parts of Ukraine’s GTS 
in reverse flow, exactly what Ukraine did during the January 2009 crisis. This had played a 
role in extending the duration of the crisis – since the reverse flow operations meant that a 
resumption of Russian deliveries couldn’t be accepted. New storage facilities in Eastern 
Ukraine would therefore increase security of supply for Ukraine’s Eastern regions without 
prejudice to the normal (East-to-West) operation of the GTS.  Additional storage would also 
be useful in case a proposed Ukrainian LNG terminal were built. The issue of LNG imports 
to Ukraine is briefly addressed in a later section. 
 
4. Key drivers of Ukraine’s current political orientation 
The  many  developments  listed  in  the  last  section  illustrate  how  Ukraine  under  the 
Yanukovych Presidency has sought to alleviate severe economic and energy policy chal-
lenges by making far-reaching arrangements with the Russian Federation. In both political 
and economic terms, some of the concessions Ukraine has made have been highly con-32 
troversial both inside Ukraine and in the West. The merger or swapping of assets across 
several strategic components of Ukraine’s national economy and the partial re-orientation 
of Ukraine’s foreign, security and defence policies unfolded very rapidly, raising the ques-
tion of Ukraine’s future as a genuinely independent country. Symbolic political gestures 
concerning the use of the Russian language and the recent scrapping of Stepan Bandera’s 
‘Hero of Ukraine’ status also seemed to suggest a deeper “pro-Russia” orientation. Taking 
these developments together, the question which seems most relevant is to determine the 
motives of the current Ukrainian Presidency. As is typically the case with real government 
policies, there are often several reasons for any particular decision, as well as more than 
one general driver or motive for a government’s strategies. However a useful analysis can 
be made by formulating four hypotheses concerning the primary motive for Ukraine’s cur-




Political hypotheses concerning the Yanukovych Presidency 
 
Hypothesis  Name  Consistent with 
1  National interest  Realism 
2  Private interests  Kleptocracy 
3  Russia first  “Unionism” 
4  Power first  Authoritarianism 
 
Source: authors’ formulations 
 
 
The first hypothesis presumes that the Ukrainian leadership pursues a realist and prag-
matic policy driven by a strong commitment to national interests and the acknowledgement 
that Ukraine’s current position of weakness could be overcome only by painful compro-
mises. The ‘gas for Sevastopol’ deal exemplifies such compromise, in which something 
symbolically valuable but not crucial for the core interests is traded for absolutely neces-
sary economic concessions. Two key assumptions in this supposition is that accession to 
NATO is not seen as important or even desirable by the Yanukovych team, while eco-
nomic failure is perceived as the main threat to Ukraine’s existence. 
The second hypothesis focuses on the parochial economic interest of several business 
groups that are effectively controlling Ukraine’s politics and seek to maximize the profits 
derived from the ‘privatization’ of the government. The richest Ukrainian ‘oligarch’, Rinat 
Akhmetov, is often portrayed as the main sponsor of Yanukovych’s career (Dmytro Firtash 
is now believed to be the main sponsor), while Deputy Prime Ministers Sergei Tigipko and 
Andrei Klyuev have their own private business interests. Corruption is the main political 
driver in this perspective, but it is also important that the ‘oligarchs’ are investing in their 33 
core business and not simply ‘stealing’ the state. Getting cheaper gas is crucial for preserv-
ing profit margins, but the Russian business tycoons must be kept at bay in their aggres-
sive acquisitions of Ukrainian assets. 
 
The third hypothesis ascribes to the Ukrainian leadership an ideological intention of build-
ing a closer alliance with Russia and a willingness to sacrifice key elements of state sover-
eignty. Rejection of Western values and curtailing of efforts to build closer ties with the EU 
are parts of the same ‘Russia-first’ course, which is underpinned by the desire to change 
the identity of the Ukrainian state-project according to the vision of a Slavic/Orthodox ‘civili-
zation’. Closer economic integration with Russia then becomes both the main way of ad-
vancing this ‘natural’ unity and the key means of lifting Ukraine from the quagmire of re-
cession. An important assumption in this perspective is that cross-border business net-
works, including those in the gas sector, could grow fast without any conflicts caused by 
competition between ‘territorial’ business empires. 
The last hypothesis suggests that the main driver of Ukraine’s foreign policy is politics itself 
– the desire of the ruling group to keep power in its hands by building a dominant political 
machine. The intention to convert political control into financial gain is a part of this plan but 
the notion of ‘national interest’ is only a figure of speech in propaganda manipulations of 
the electorate. The ‘oligarchs’ are kept on a short leash in this power-centric model; the 
pattern of permanent reconfiguration of leadership that was reinforced by the ‘orange revo-
lution’ is replaced with a one-party rule; and the remarkably rich culture of political com-
promises is discarded. 
 
Testing the hypotheses 
There are elements of plausibility to each hypothesis, and expert opinion is currently me-
andering between them, but it appears possible to apply a set of simple logical tests to 
each of them. We assess each hypothesis in view of twelve test cases and assess in each 
case the adequacy of the hypotheses. The overview of this assessment is given in Table 4. 
A plus sign symbolises consistency, a minus sign inconsistency, a zero denotes neutrality 
and a question mark denotes an undetermined result. 
The logic of the first hypothesis suggests that the ‘realist-minded’ leadership cannot bar-
gain on vital ‘national interests’, must try to counter-balance external dependencies, and 
keeps trading symbolic values for tangible benefits. The delimitation of the maritime border 
in the Kerch Strait is a good test for the first hypothesis, and its result is affirmative, as 
Ukraine refuses to yield any ground to Russia.  
The second test case is the intensity of Ukraine’s contacts with the EU. One may for in-
stance mention Ukraine’s willingness to align domestic energy market regulations with EU 
standards, see Section 5, as well as ongoing efforts to secure an association agreement 
and a free-trade agreement. These moves are all opposed by Russia, explicitly in the case 
of energy market regulation, implicitly in the case of the free-trade agreement (see next test 
case below). This is however an area of policy inconsistency for the Yanukovych leader-34 
ship. Its selective use of the justice system to neutralise political opposition (especially from 
Tymoshenko and her allies) and its clampdown on media freedom is leading to warnings 
and condemnations from both the United States and the European Union, thus threatening 




Assessment of political hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses  Hypothesis 1  Hypothesis 2  Hypothesis 3  Hypothesis 4 
   National interest  Private interests  Russia first  Power first 
Test cases             
Firmness on Kerch Strait 
border issue 
+  -  -  + 
EU association and free-
trade agreements 
+  +  -  - 
Not joining the Russian 
Customs Union 
+  -/+  -  - 
“No block” pledge (No 
CSTO membership) 
+  0  -  0 
Industrial assets partly 
cordoned off  
+  +  -  + 
Relative lack of oligarch-
friendly policies 
+  -  0  - 
Russian language not 
raised to official status 
+  -  -  + 
Abrogation of Stepan 
Bandera’s Hero status 
-  0  +  - 
Cooperation with Putin’s 
United Russia party 
-  -  0/+  - 
Appointing loyalist to 
Kiev City administration 
0  0  0  + 
Not boosting the power 
of the security services 
+  +  0  - 
Lack of clampdown on 
oligarchs 
+/-  +  0  - 
 
Source: authors’ assessments 
 
The partly symmetric test case is the possible accession of Ukraine to the Russia-led Cus-
toms Union (under effect since 6 July 2010 with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) which 
Ukraine has declined. Joining the Customs Union could have benefitted many Ukrainian 
exporters (notably from the Yanukovych power base), but it would have prevented an in-
dependent Ukrainian trade policy including a (separate) free-trade agreement with the EU, 
itself also potentially beneficial for Ukrainian exporters. In defence policy Yanukovych sig-
nalled the abandonment of the previous administration’s NATO membership goal. This 
was a non-choice given German and French opposition anyway, so the test case is the 35 
voluntary choice made in favour of a “no block” pledge, signifying a lack of interest in the 
Russian-controlled military block, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). 
The evidence for the second hypothesis should support the straightforward ‘money rules’ 
logic with the important clarification about ‘our money’. One obvious test for it is the protec-
tion of Ukrainian assets – from the Antonov Aeronautic Complex to the Kremenchug oil 
refinery – from Russian ‘predators’, and this protectionism is indeed well documented. A 
particular case here is the careful containment of Gazprom’s attack on Naftogaz, including 
the rejection of offers for joint control over the gas infrastructure, as noted in Section 3. One 
could also expect a business-friendly anti-crisis policy, with rescue packages to ‘oligarchs-
in-need’ and privatization on the cheap, but Yanukovych has generally followed the IMF 
guidelines and thus secured many new loans.  
An ambitious intention to alter the identity of the Ukrainian state in the third hypothesis is 
not necessarily in conflict with the economic interests prevalent in the previous case. The 
best test here is the uplifting of the Russian language to the status of the second state lan-
guage, but Yanukovych, despite earlier promises and in the face of negative reactions in 
Western  Ukraine,  is  tending  towards  a  compromise  along  the  lines  of  the  Council  of 
Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Another test case is the 
recent cancellation of the Yushchenko presidential decree that awarded Stepan Bandera 
the honour of ‘Hero of Ukraine’. This was a goal of the Yanukovych team and a friendly 
signal to Moscow. However a deliberately slow and indirect process was chosen, see e.g. 
New York Times (2011), operating through the justice system and based on a technical-
ity
11, rather than by direct decree. While the original Yushchenko decree was arguably a 
divisive move, better statesmanship would have called for an attempt at national reconcilia-
tion
12 on this highly emblematic question of national historical identity. An additional test 
concerns closer ties between the Party of Regions (of Yanukovych) and the United Russia 
party of Vladimir Putin. While the interest from the Russian side is clear – an attempt to 
create a Moscow-centred network of like-minded political parties in the former Soviet space 
– the importance and ultimate effect of this potential channel of influence is not yet clear, 
so the test result remains undetermined at this point in time. 
The prevalence of political drivers in the fourth hypothesis involves determined efforts from 
the ruling group at expanding its support base and ensuring its ability to win elections. One 
test here is the control over the political machine in Kiev, which was the epicentre of the 
Orange Revolution, and Yanukovych has indeed replaced the head of the city administra-
tion with a loyalist. The last two test cases concern more typically ‘Putinistic’ actions which 
                                                            
11 The first step in the process, taken by a Donetsk (Eastern Ukraine) court in April 2010, was to 
rule that the Yushchenko decree was unlawful because Bandera wasn’t a Ukrainian citizen. 
Yushchenko, now as a private citizen, appealed against the decision. His appeal was not taken 
into consideration by the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine, hence the Donetsk decision 
was not overruled and therefore now has legal force, see Kyiv Post (2011a). 
12 The Regional Council of Lviv (Western Ukraine) held a special session in front of the Stepan 
Bandera monument in protest, see Ukrinform (2011), while opposition deputy Kirilenko stated 
his view that “this is an anti-Ukrainian decision (…) motivated by political concerns [and] will 
widen the split in society and increase political tension”, see Kyiv Post (2011b). 36 
could have been undertaken but were not. The first action would have been to boost the 
budget, power and reach of the security services. Remarkably little has occurred in that 
direction. The second action would have been to tame the oligarchs, for example by selec-
tively prosecuting one of them for corruption (or some other offence). However no moves 
of this sort have been observed. 
None of the twelve listed cases constitutes an ultimate ‘litmus test’ and one should also not 
treat the results of this assessment in a statistical manner given that many other important 
cases could also be considered. The ‘gas-for-Sevastopol’ deal, for instance, would argua-
bly be consistent with all four hypotheses if one considers its short-term implications, but 
the long-term implications, in terms of limiting Ukraine’s freedom of action in its foreign and 
defence policies, are clearly negative. 
 
Interpretation and implications 
Every hypothesis identifying a single driver of political behaviour involves a big dose of 
simplification,  so  mixed  results  are  not  surprising,  and  greater  number  of  tests  would 
probably confirm that real policy-making always involves a combination of contradictory 
motives and interests. One conclusion that can be drawn with reasonable certainty from 
the collected data is that a pan-Slavic ambition to foster an ‘ever-closer union’ with Russia 
has very little place in the goals pursued by the Ukrainian leadership. Only a few bitterly 
disappointed supporters of the Orange Revolution argue along the lines of this hypothesis, 
while most experts would insist that pro-Russian forces are absent from the motley Ukrain-
ian political arena. Political motives are certainly present among the drivers of policy-setting 
and it could be argued that Yanukovych has performed far above expectations in consoli-
dating control, but his deviations from democracy remain nevertheless relatively innocent 
comparing with Putin’s ‘vertical of power’.  Wish-lists of friendly ‘oligarchs’ are granted privi-
leged attention of the government, which is as (extremely) corrupt as for instance Nigeria 
or Zimbabwe, but on balance, Yanukovych has demonstrated greater independence from 
parochial interests of the Donetsk clan than the second hypothesis presumes.  The idea of 
‘national interests’ is always open to interpretation but it can be convincingly argued that 
the Ukrainian leadership sticks to its (honestly-held) interpretation of those interests and 
strives to safeguard them to the degree possible in severely unfavourable conditions. 
The gas business involves a particularly complex interplay of conflicting interests so that 
the  need  to  reduce  payments  to  Moscow  (including  by  developing  domestic  non-
conventional sources) somewhat contradicts Ukraine’s self-presentation as the shortest 
and most reliable transit route. The desire to keep control over the domestic gas transmis-
sion system also exacerbates the lack of funds for their modernisation. Yanukovych has to 
resort to delays and bluffs, playing a very weak hand against EU plans to diversify sources 
of gas supply (which means less transit through Ukraine), and against the Russian plan to 
diversify  transit  routes  by  constructing  the  Nord  Stream  and  South  Stream  pipelines. 
Ukraine’s hopes are pinned on the possibility of terminating the latter project due to its ex-
orbitant  costs  but,  in  Gazprom’s  peculiar  assessments  of  cost-efficiency,  extra-high  in-37 
vestments in construction mean larger volumes of profit for sub-contractors and fatter bo-
nuses for managers.   
 
5. In search of energy policy independence? 
Ukraine’s many concessions to Russia may give the impression that the country has given 
up on a genuinely independent course. The opposite is however the case. As soon as the 
new Ukrainian government understood that Moscow wasn’t inclined to make more sub-
stantial offers to Ukraine, a return to a “multi-vector” energy policy started to be developed. 
Three pillars of policy may be identified: the alignment of domestic gas market regulations 
with the EU Acquis; a trilateral approach (EU-Russia-Ukraine) to modernising the domestic 
GTS; and policies to reduce dependence on Russian imports. In addition Ukraine is also 
interested in reviving gas trade with Central Asia over the Russian route. 
Ukraine wishes to align its legislation with the EU Acquis. In June 2010 the Ukrainian par-
liament passed the  law  “On the bases of the functioning of the natural  gas market in 
Ukraine”. The law orders: 
 
·  the elimination of monopoly positions; 
·  the introduction of a competitive internal gas market; 
·  the provision of non-discriminatory third party access to the GTS; 
·  the separation of transmission operations from distribution operations; 
 
The most important regulations should come into force over the 2012-2015 period. Consis-
tent with this approach, Ukraine is also in the final stages of accession to the Energy 
Community which drives forward a (lagged) adoption of the EU Acquis on energy in non-
EU  countries  in  Eastern  and  South-eastern  Europe.  The  Protocol  of  Membership  was 
submitted in November 2010 to the Ukrainian parliament for ratification. There are however 
risks of intervening revisions to the new legislation, as well as delays or disruptions to the 
ratification procedure for Energy Community membership, as a result of ongoing Russian 
pressure. Valery Yazev, Deputy Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and 
President of the Russian Gas Association, stated that passing such legislation would block 
the path to further Russo-Ukrainian integration, and seemed to threaten the Ukrainian side 
by stating that the Ukrainian pipeline system would “whither away”, see Dyen (2010). 
Ukraine’s GTS is in need of wide-ranging modernisation and investment. Ukraine’s 2009 
attempt  (under  Yuschchenko  and  Tymoshenko)  to  proceed  with  primarily  Western  in-
volvement in the modernisation of the GTS, culminating in the 23 March 2009 agreement 
between the European Commission and Ukraine, had come under heavy Russian fire. The 
new approach is to push for a trilateral approach, Russia-EU-Ukraine. The first major meet-
ing with the Commission took place on 22 November 2010 in Brussels, where Yanukovych 
re-affirmed Ukraine’s opposition to the South Stream project and his commitment to Euro-
pean security of supply, see e.g. New York Times (2010). However Ukraine hasn’t ob-38 
tained long-term guarantees of increasing transit volumes or guarantees of investment for 
the modernisation of the GTS. 
In parallel, Ukraine wishes to achieve a lower degree of import dependence as well as a 
lower reliance on Russian imports. The Ukrainian government has set the goal of increas-
ing domestic gas production over the next 10 years from 20 bcm per year to at least 30 
bcm. This is to be pursued by developing conventional offshore deposits in the Black Sea 
as well as non-conventional resources, in particular shale gas and coal-bed methane de-
posits. The success or failure of these goals will crucially depend on foreign investments. 
Russia  has  (unsurprisingly)  expressed  interest  in  all  Ukrainian  projects.  However  both 
types of projects are technology-intensive and Western companies are better placed to 
play a role. The commercial development of shelf gas deposits in the Black Sea could de-
velop through two projects. The first project is led by a company called Vanco Prykerchen-
ska. A production-sharing agreement (PSA) was signed in 2008 already, but was later 
cancelled. While the composition of Vanco Prykerchenska is somewhat murky
13, see De-
mydenko (2008) and Yeremenko (2008), relations with the Ukrainian government seem to 
be on the mend, see Kyiv Post (2010). The second project is the previously-mentioned 
joint venture between Naftogaz and Gazprom. Since 2010 the government has began to 
elaborate program of shale and coal gas production. Ukrainian shale gas reserves are little 
explored and estimated to be in a range of 2 to 32 trillion cubic metres.  The first step is a 
pilot extraction project over 2010-2014, estimated to cost USD 500 million, around 20% of 
which would be covered from the state budget. One challenge is the likely high cost of the 
extracted gas as compared to prices on the Ukrainian market, also given the discount se-
cured by Ukraine for Russian gas. As a result, Naftogaz hasn’t shown a strong interest. On 
the other hand, potential foreign investors include Shell, PKN Orlen and TNK-BP. At the 
same time, experts from the gas industry suspect that, for obvious reasons, Gazprom’s 
interest in this area is rather to deter the development of shale and coal gas in Ukraine. 
 
Ukraine is also interested in reviving gas trade with Central Asia over the Russian route. 
This would bring Ukraine back to its earlier situation – a combination of “Russian” and 
“Central Asian” imports, all transiting through Russia and controlled by Gazprom and by 
the Russian state – pursued because the “Central Asian” gas might be somewhat cheaper. 
This is a danger zone for Ukraine’s external gas policy. It is tempting for both economic 
and private interests, but it does nothing to reduce the strategic dependence on Gazprom 
and its resulting pricing power on the Ukrainian economy. 
More usefully, Ukraine also wishes to diversify its sources of imports by building an LNG 
terminal  on  the  Black  Sea  coast.  A  state-owned  enterprise  (“National  project  LNG-
terminal”) was established in December 2010 with the aim of building the terminal and a 
                                                            
13 Owned in equal shares by Vanco International (a 100%-owned affiliate of Houston-based 
Vanco Energy Company), DTEK Holdings Limited of Ukrainian businessman Rinat Akhmetov, 
Shadowlight  Investments  Limited  of  Russian  businessman  Yevgeniy  Novitsky,  and  Integrum 
Technologies Limited of Austria (unknown owners). 39 
regasification plant
14. The goal would be to start operations in 2015 with a capacity of 5 
bcm per year, rising to 10 bcm per year from 2016, see Moscow Times (2010). Azerbaijani 
supplies shipped from Georgia could be a major source of supplies. A Memorandum be-
tween  Ukraine  and  Azerbaijan  to  that  effect  has  been  approved.  If  all  goes  to  plan, 
Ukraine’s LNG terminal would represent a substantial diversification of supply sources, 




Ukraine’s main external energy policy goals are to hold down gas import prices, to promote 
the continued (and if possible expanded) use of its infrastructure for transit of Russian gas 
to Europe, to encourage the cancellation of the South Stream project, to secure foreign 
investment and assistance in upgrading its gas transmission system on the basis of a tri-
lateral approach (EU-Russia-Ukraine), and to decrease its dependence on Russian im-
ports by building an LNG terminal. Ukraine’s main domestic energy policy initiatives are to 
reform domestic gas prices and raise energy efficiency, to ensure the financial balance of 
Naftogaz without state subsidies, to reform the regulation of its domestic gas market in line 
with EU legislation, and to increase the domestic production of natural gas in collaboration 
with foreign investors, including Russia. 
Taken  together,  these  policy  developments  suggest  a  well-thought-out  strategy.  Given 
Ukraine’s economic vulnerabilities, its government decided to pay a price: foreign and de-
fence policy concessions, and some economic concessions, in exchange for substantial 
relief in terms of its gas import bill. Pressures from Russia continue to bear upon Ukraine, 
as the former has an altogether more ambitious vision for integrating and controlling key 
assets and key policies of the latter. However these pressures are considerably less ag-
gressive than during the Yushchenko Presidency, and much less likely to lead to significant 
conflicts. The risk of supply disruptions of the kind seen in January 2006 and in January 
2009 seems very low for the near future.  
According to our analysis, Ukraine’s leadership has been mainly driven by a “realist” un-
derstanding of its relations with Russia in line with its core economic interests, not by a 
“Russia first” agenda. Domestically speaking, while corruption is still at massive levels, and 
while the interplay of private and public interests remains unhelpful, the current govern-
ment seems more inclined towards consolidation of political power than towards the private 
interests of its members, though these goals sometimes overlap. In that context, several 
negative developments have taken shape with respect to liberal democratic standards. The 
justice system has been used selectively in an obvious attempt to shut down political com-
petition and pressures against the media are a serious concern. However talk of a “Putini-
sation” of Ukraine seems too pessimistic an assessment at this point in time. Conditionality 
from the EU (and to a lesser degree the United States) could be an important countervail-
                                                            
14  Dmytro  Firtash,  RosUkrEnergo’s  co-owner,  has  declared  an  interest  in  the  project  as  he 
commits to moving out of the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade. 40 
ing force, certainly preferable to a domestic political backlash or to a further slide towards 
authoritarianism. 
Concerning Ukraine’s domestic gas market, the country’s dependence on stop-gap sup-
port  from  the  IMF  encouraged  the  adoption  of  necessary  domestic  gas  price  reforms. 
Gradual alignment with import prices seems feasible both politically and economically pro-
vided it occurs at the right pace. The potential longer-run effects of these reforms could 
make a significant contribution to Ukraine’s energy security position as well. Another crucial 
question is the restructuring of Naftogaz in the context of Ukraine’s drive towards unbun-
dling. There is a strong probability that some form of separation between transmission (in-
cluding transit of Russian gas) and distribution activities will occur. However it also seems 
likely that the Ukrainian leadership will develop ways to exert continued control on the en-
tire industry after these reforms take place. 
Three further points should be mentioned. The first is an expressed interest in reviving the 
gas trade with Turkmenistan, with Russia as the transit partner. This is a danger zone for 
Ukraine. It may be packaged (again) in a way that seems tempting for the Ukrainian lead-
ership, but should be avoided. Central Asian gas handled by Gazprom (as opposed to 
“Russian gas” handled by Gazprom) is a false solution to pricing and diversification chal-
lenges. Instead, LNG from Azerbaijan (for example) would be a genuine solution for diver-
sification, while domestic energy price reform and other (broader) measures to boost com-
petitiveness are real solutions to high energy import prices. Second, the drive towards 
power consolidation has meant moves against Tymoshenko and her allies. The highly tar-
geted  nature  of  these  measures  is  damaging  for  the  international  reputation  of  the 
Yanukovych leadership and a threat to relations with the European Union. Moreover, in 
spite of (or perhaps because of) her own controversial involvement in the gas trade in the 
1990s, Tymoshenko should in retrospect be recognised as one of the few Ukrainian politi-
cians who actually understood the implications of Ukraine’s successive gas import con-
tracts. Ukraine has yet to develop a constructive culture of political opposition where former 
political figures are seen not only as political challengers but also as bearers of valuable 
experience in national leadership. Third, and this is related to the two points above, one of 
Ukraine’s main structural weaknesses is its very high level of corruption. This generates 
major economic distortions and also does severe harm to Ukraine’s international reputa-
tion. Reforms to address this issue have been comparatively successful in some transition 
countries and should also be attempted in Ukraine – instead of selectively prosecuting past 
instances of individual corruption for political purposes. 
Two fundamental issues in Russian-Ukrainian gas relations remain open. From the Rus-
sian side, an outright merger (de facto an acquisition) of Naftogaz remains the goal, some-
thing which the Ukrainian leadership is unlikely to accept. From the Ukrainian side, the 
cancellation of the South Stream project, at least as it is currently planned, combined with a 
commitment to raising transit volumes through Ukraine would be a major victory. However 
this vision depends on the success of the trilateral (EU-Russia-Ukraine) approach now 
being promoted by Ukraine for its gas transmission system, as well as on longer-term EU 41 
gas demand patterns for which significant uncertainty prevails. Conversely, the interest of 
EU actors and of Russia in that project also depends on how committed they are to the 
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The European Union is highly dependent on imports for all fossil fuels. The EU’s own re-
serves of conventional natural gas, primarily located in the North Sea, are in rapid and es-
sentially terminal decline. As a result, the EU’s net import dependence for natural gas is 
generally projected to rise from around 60% today (based on 2007 data) to between 75% 
and 80% by 2020 and to between 84% and 89% by 2030, see Christie (2010) for an over-
view of recent scenarios. In parallel, the fragmentation of the EU’s natural gas markets in 
combination with the essentially national approach taken by EU Member States in matters 
of external energy policy has been seen as increasingly unsatisfactory. A notable devel-
opment in this regard is the joint declaration of 5 May 2010 by the President of the Euro-
pean Parliament Jerzy Buzek and former Commission President Jacques Delors on the 
need to create a European Energy Community.  
One aspect of the fragmentation between EU Member States is the bilateral nature of gas 
import contracts. EU gas companies have typically entered into large state-backed long-
term supply contracts with suppliers such as Gazprom with pricing clauses that are subject 
to confidentiality. However such information does tend to seep out
16. The uncovering of 
large gaps in import prices for Russian gas, notably between the Baltic States and Ger-
many, have therefore led to strong political demand for a consolidation of the bargaining 
power of EU customers. According to Arvydas Sekmokas, Lithuania’s Minister of Energy, 
Lithuania pays around 100 US dollars per thousand cubic metre (USD/tcm) more than 
does Germany for its imports of Russian gas
17.  
The proposal made by Jerzy Buzek and Jacques Delors is to “engage in coordinated en-
ergy purchasing, should the need arise”, see European Parliament (2010). Andoura et al. 
(2010), the policy paper that outlines in more detail the concept of the European Energy 
Community, clarifies that coordinated purchasing could take either a weak form, namely 
the formation of consortia of companies and Member States, or a strong form, namely the 
creation of a fully-fledged EU gas purchasing agency - in other words the creation of a 
‘single buyer’ for natural gas imports. The goal in this paper is to offer an analysis of the 
                                                            
15 Contact information: Edward.Hunter.Christie@gmail.com  
16 Christie (2009) proposed that it should be compulsory for EU gas companies to release in-
formation on bilateral supply contracts and import values to EU institutions and (all) Member 
State governments, for instance under the auspices of the Agency for the Coordination of En-
ergy Regulators (ACER). 
17 Welcome address given at the opening of the 11th IAEE European Conference in Vilnius, 
Lithuania, 26 August 2010. 43 
potential for these options, namely the effects of consolidating buyer power in the context 
of gas supply contract negotiations. The analysis starts with a review of the recent devel-
opments and scenario projections for the EU’s long-term natural gas import requirements. 
The background to the concept of the single buyer is then given, with a description of the 
chosen theoretical model from the literature. Stylised surplus functions for a gas exporter 
and for gas importers are then constructed, leading to numerical simulations of key cases. 
An analysis of the potential impacts on import prices and quantities is then offered, fol-
lowed by a brief policy discussion and ideas for further research. 
 
 
2. Prospects for EU gas import demand 
The EU’s Climate and Energy Package, or New Energy Policy (the 20-20-20 targets), had 
initially been projected to lead to substantially lower demand for natural gas imports ac-
cording to Commission projections using the PRIMES energy model, see European Com-
mission (2008). Subsequent energy model projections, e.g. from IEA (2009a) and from 
Eurogas, point to less dramatic effects. A review of those scenarios is given in Christie 
(2010). Significant uncertainties remain for the 2030 horizon and beyond depending on 
policy choices. In spite of the failure to secure a global agreement at the COP15 talks in 
Copenhagen in December 2009, it is generally assumed that the European Union will 
commit to substantial cuts in emissions for 2030 in the first instance and then onwards to 
2050.  Recent  political  commitments  outline  the  goal  of  achieving  a  cut  in  greenhouse 
gases of at least 80% on the 1990 level by 2050, see e.g. Group of Eight (2009). The base 
assumptions corresponding to this ambitious vision correspond to an attempt to stabilise 
atmospheric concentration of CO2 to 450 parts per million (ppm). In this section we focus 
only
18 on the most recent scenarios from the IEA World Energy Outlook 2010 (IEA, 2010), 
see Figure 1. The scale is cut at 300 Mtoe in order to improve readability. The Current 
Policies scenario is the most conservative scenario, assuming only that existing market 
and public policy instruments function effectively in line with official targets. It does not as-
sume that policy commitments or targets will be met if there are no policy instruments in 
place for their implementation. The New Policies scenario additionally assumes that official 
targets and commitments made for the 2020 horizon are met even if aspects of their con-
crete implementation are not yet complete. In the EU case this includes meeting all of the 
20-20-20 targets. The  450 scenario assumes that additional (ambitious)  measures are 
taken to ensure a long-term stabilisation of atmospheric CO2 emissions at 450 ppm. The 
difference between the Current Policies and New Policies scenarios is relatively limited 
although it does gather momentum by 2030-2035.  
 
                                                            
18 The new scenario projections of the European Commission, see DG Energy (2010), focus 
rather more on the EU targets to 2020 and end in 2030, while IEA (2010) develops a fully-
fledged ‘450 scenario’ and extends the projection period to 2035. 44 
Figure 1 




Source: IEA (2010). Units: millions of tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe). 
 
Figure 2 




Source: IEA (2010), own calculations. Production profile based on New Policies scenario. Assumed conversion factor for 
demand: 1.217 bcm (GCV) / Mtoe (NCV) 
 
This is due to the fact that the 20-20-20 targets of the European Union are already partially 
































policies that should contribute to partially meeting the renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency targets. On the other hand the 450 scenario diverges strongly from the other sce-
narios, implying a historical peak for natural gas demand sometime between 2008 and 
2020 followed by a fall of roughly 21% on the 2008 level by 2035. The New Policies sce-
nario on the other hand projects a rise in demand of about 10% by 2035, almost all of 
which would be achieved by 2030, after which only very modest growth would seem likely. 
The evolution of import demand follows a somewhat different pattern to that of total de-
mand. Because EU production is falling rapidly, the moment when import demand peaks 
occurs much later than the moment when total demand peaks, see Figure 2 (the scale is 
cut at 200 bcm in order to improve readability).  
The Current Policies scenario can be seen as highly unlikely given the political momentum 
in favour of (somewhat) ambitious climate change policies in the European Union, while 
the range offered by the gap between the New Policies and 450 scenarios seems a good 
guide to what could unfold over the projection period. The gap between the 450 and New 
Policies scenario is around 40 bcm per year in 2020 and around 110 bcm per year in 2030. 
The dynamics are also fundamentally different. In the 450 scenario, import demand would 
reach a peak around 2030 of around 360 bcm per year and then start to fall, while it would 
continue to rise beyond 2035 in the New Policies scenario, rising above 500 bcm per year 
in the process. The challenge of uncertainty of demand for natural gas therefore remains 
firmly on the table especially after 2020. On the supply side the main developments are a 
rapidly falling total production with only a modest contribution from unconventional sources. 
EU production is projected to fall from 216 bcm in 2008 to 112 bcm by 2030, a fall of 
around 50%. The overall conclusion is that the EU’s net import dependence will rise sub-
stantially to 2030 in all scenarios, see Table 1. Furthermore, even a fully successful imple-
mentation of highly ambitious climate change policies, leading to significant falls in total 
demand in the short-term, will not suffice to compensate for the fall in domestic production. 
Moreover it bears noting that even the inclusion of Norway (say, if one considers the pro-
duction in the EEA) does not suffice to reverse the trend of decline. As noted in IEA (2010: 
192), declines in production first in the UK and then in the Netherlands strongly outweigh a 
projected growth in Norwegian production. 
 
Table 1 
EU gas import dependence ratio: 2008 to 2035 
 
   Current Policies  New Policies  450 Scenario 
2008  60%  60%  60% 
2020  72%  72%  69% 
2030  82%  81%  77% 
2035  86%  84%  78% 
Source: IEA (2010), own calculations. 
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3. Modelling framework 
The negotiating power of buyers in the literature on bilateral oligopolies is generally re-
ferred to as countervailing power. A general definition of countervailing power may be 
given as “the ability of large buyers in concentrated downstream markets to extract price 
concessions from suppliers”, see Snyder (2005).  
One class of models, developed notably by Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Inderst and 
Wey (2003), can be described as follows: assume one monopoly supplier and several 
buyers (i=1, .., n), each of which purchases a quantity qi. The supplier enters into simulta-
neous negotiations with each of the buyers separately. Negotiations determine the quanti-
ties to be traded, qi, and the tariffs Ti for each bundle. In line with a Nash equilibrium, the 
supplier and the respective buyer maximise the joint surplus (sum of profits) from their 
agreement, and split the surplus equally. 
Each buyer is assumed to be serving a separate market, e.g. in different regions or even 
different countries, such that the downstream demand functions are considered independ-
ent from each other. The base assumption of separate downstream markets is an impor-
tant departure from classical models of monopoly provision. Intuitively, an individual buyer 
is essentially unaffected by the price obtained by another buyer because they each supply 
separate markets through separate physical outlets. These outlets are geographically too 
distant from one another to serve a common market due to transportation costs. The eco-
nomic geography of natural gas infrastructure fits well with this general assumption. Recent 
research that applies this framework to European gas imports includes Caldas Cabrera 
(2009) and Ikonnikova and Zwart (2010). 
The net surplus (profit) earned by the supplier is given in (1), where V(Q) is what Chipty 
and Snyder (1999) call ‘gross surplus’, in other words the profit of the supplier net of the 
revenues from sales to the buyers. V(Q) contains all of the costs incurred by the supplier, 
including the costs of producing Q, as well as any revenues from other activities that may 
exist. The net surplus of buyer i is given in (2). Similarly, vi(qi) is the ‘gross surplus’ for the 
buyer, including the revenue of activities that use qi as an input, any other revenues, minus 
all costs except the tariff paid for obtaining qi. 
 
V Q  + ∑ T 
 
         (1)     
 
v  q   − T       (2)     
 
The bargaining equilibrium is such that the gains from trade between the seller and the 
buyers equalise. Therefore, as shown in (3), the incremental gain in net surplus when one 
more negotiation (here with buyer a) is successful brings equal benefits to the seller and to 
the additional buyer, and this holds for all negotiations, i.e. for all buyers. 
 
V Q  + ∑ T 
 
  −  V Q − q   + ∑ T 
 
      = v  q   − T     ∀ a = 1,…,n    (3) 
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Solving (3) for Ta, as shown in (4), yields the vector of equilibrium tariffs Ta* shown in (5). 
 





  v  q   + V Q − q   − V Q     ∀ a = 1,…,n    (5) 
 
Substituting (5) into (1) and (2) yields the expressions for the equilibrium quantities. The 
net surplus for buyer a in equilibrium is shown in (6). 
 
 
  v  q   + V Q  − V Q − q       (6) 
 
We now label the corresponding equilibrium quantities qi
s and Q
s, in reference to the fact 
that the buyers all remain separated from each other, and compute an alternative equilib-
rium where, say, buyers 1 and 2 have merged. We label the equilibrium quantities for that 
second equilibrium as qi
m and Q
m. 
Departing from Chipty and Snyder (1999) we do not consider the possibility of a full merger 
of buyer companies which would lead to a new buyer surplus function for the joint entity 
which may be quite different from the sum of the two initial surplus functions. Instead we 
consider only the idea of consolidating orders, i.e. joint bargaining, and assume that coor-
dination and sharing of rents between the two buyers is seamless, i.e. that there is no sec-
ond-round game where the agreement to operate jointly could break down ex post. Joint 
bargaining leads to a joint tariff for the buyers, and therefore to a joint unit price which may 
be different from either or both prices achieved when bargaining separately. In addition, the 
joint quantity may differ from the sum of the quantities that result from separate bargaining. 
The net surplus of buyers 1 and 2 in the separated equilibrium is shown in (7), while their 
net surplus in the “merged” equilibrium is shown in (8). 
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The consolidation is favourable for the buyers if the quantity shown in (8) is greater than 
the quantity shown in (7) and if that is the case it is assumed that the buyers recognise this 
and join forces. As in Chipty and Snyder (1999), re-arranging terms from (8) > (7), and 
adding on each side of the inequality sign the net supplier surplus from the separated equi-
librium when there is trade with neither buyer 1 nor with buyer 2, leads to the condition 
shown in (9). 
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The additional term on each side of the inequality sign helps to construct a breakdown of 
components that each have a clear economic interpretation. Chipty and Snyder (1999) 
define them as follows: downstream efficiency DE (efficiency gains for the buyers from the 
fact of merging); upstream efficiency UE (indirect effect on the surplus of the supplier due 
to possible changes in total quantity sold); and what the authors refer to as ‘bargaining 
position’. We prefer to refer to that last component as ‘incremental separated bargaining 
power’ and label it as ISBP. The three terms are shown in (10), (11) and (12). 
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UE =  V Q   − V Q  − q 
  − q 
    −  V Q   − V Q  − q 
  − q 
     (11)   
 
ISBP =  V Q  − q 
   − V Q  − q 
  − q 
    −  V Q   − V Q  − q 
     (12)   
 
The condition that (8) > (7), i.e. that it is profitable for buyers 1 and 2 to consolidate, is 
equivalent to the condition that DE + UE + ISBP > 0. 
 
The term ISBP represents the incremental gross surplus effect for the supplier in the sepa-
rated equilibrium. In particular, it is the incremental gross surplus from buyer 1 when buyer 
2 is out, minus the incremental gross surplus of buyer 1 when buyer 2 is in. Chipty and 
Snyder (1999) develop a detailed analysis of this term. For the purposes of this paper, the 
first goal is to understand the effect on prices of the consolidation of 2 (or more) buyers. 
The second goal is not to consider whether buyers should merge, but only whether they 
should make their purchases (and relevant bargaining) jointly or separately. The second 
question remains as stated, namely that the sum over (10) to (12) should be greater than 
zero. As specified, the buyers do not merge so there is no new surplus function which 
could result for instance from synergy effects between the buyers. Joint buyer surplus is 
thus simply the sum of the surplus functions of the two buyers. An open question is how, in 
the event of joint bargaining, the two buyers would agree to split the proceeds. Here we 
assume that the sharing of rents operates through the fact of having a single price. In other 
words we will assume that the price applicable to both buyers is the jointly achieved tariff 
divided by the jointly purchased quantity. This brings us to the issue of the equilibrium price 
that is achieved in this manner. As shown in Chipty and Snyder (1999), the total tariff is 
lower in the ‘merged’ equilibrium provided that - DE + UE + ISBP > 0. The role of the DE 
term is the key as compared to the profitability condition. As we assume that the buyers do 
not merge, DE can only play a role if the equilibrium quantities are different between the 
two equilibria. If price changes occur this may be the case, unless we assume that the 
buyers do not pass through any of the price decrease (or increase) onto their customers. 
This would be a strong assumption. EU gas companies should be assumed to be profit-
maximising, so that changes in the price of their main material input, imported natural gas, 49 
should change the optimised supply curve they present on their downstream markets. We 
briefly consider each case. 
 
Fixed quantities 
Assuming that the quantities for each buyer are identical in both equilibria, DE = 0 and the 
profitability and lower total tariff conditions are identical, namely that the two buyers agree 
to bargain jointly if UE + ISBP > 0. There is however an additional consequence. As the 
quantities for buyers 1 and 2 are the same, and if we do not consider the possibilities of 
market exit or outside option, the bargaining process is identical for all the other buyer-
supplier pairings since they are bargaining over the same remaining quantity with the sup-
plier. As a result, the total quantity supplied is also the same between the two equilibria. 
Labelling the equilibrium quantities simply as q1, q2 and Q, the condition reduces to ISBP > 
0 as shown in (13). The upstream efficiency term UE is therefore also zero. 
 
UE + ISBP = ISBP =  V Q − q   − V Q − q  − q    −  V Q  − V Q − q    > 0  (13) 
 
This case ties in with the focus of Chipty and Snyder (1999) on the properties of the ISBP 
term. It is not particularly useful to repeat the full analysis here. The conclusion in the cur-
rent context is that, under the assumption of fixed quantities, consolidated buying is profit-
able depending only on the curvature of the supplier’s gross surplus function and the quan-
tities involved. In the simplest cases, if V(.) is globally concave, i.e. if V’’(x) is negative for all 
x>0, then the first term in (13) is always larger than the second term and ISBP > 0. If V(.) is 
globally convex then ISBP < 0. One important point is that V(.) may not have such strongly 
regular properties. If the curvature is reversed for higher or lower quantities, e.g. if V(.) is S-
shaped, then the results will depend on the specific quantity levels. Furthermore, the prop-
erties of V(.) will in turn determine consolidation (or merger) decisions, leading to specific 
firm-size (or coalition-size) distributions. Chipty and Snyder (1999) develop some thoughts 
in that direction in an appendix to their article. 
For the case of EU gas imports from Russia, the empirical question is therefore the shape 
and properties of the gross surplus function V(Q). We provide an illustration using Gaz-
prom data as published on the company web-site. Ideally, corporate cost functions should 
be estimated using a combination of bottom-up modelling and top-down validation. For this 
illustration we use only a rough top-down approach based on yearly corporate data from 
the  company’s  web-site  covering  the  period  2003-2008.  The  gross  surplus  function  is 
taken as profits (EBIT) minus total revenue, where total revenue is assumed to be equal to 
the proceeds from gas sales. In this way, the net surplus is, as in the model, equal to V(Q) 
plus the sum of the ‘tariffs’ (total price charged for each bundle delivered to customers). 
Also, and this is an important working assumption, the revenue and EBIT series are con-
verted into US Dollars and then deflated using the average annual oil price, the latter taken 
as the arithmetic average of the Brent and Urals oil prices. The deflation is carried out in 
order to side-step the problem that Gazprom’s export prices (to EU countries) are set ac-50 
cording to pricing clauses that track the price of selected petroleum products. Given the 
evolution of the oil price over 2003-2008, revenues and profits at current prices rose very 
strongly. 
The observed observation pairs, and a simulated quadratic function based on an OLS re-
gression on a total of 6 data points, are shown in Figure 3. A linear variant as well as a 
variant with Q and Q to the power of 1.5 were also attempted but yielded a lower R-
squared. The horizontal axis refers to delivered volumes of gas in billions of cubic metres. 
The vertical axis refers to values in millions of US dollars, deflated by the oil price with 2003 
as the reference period. The gross surplus function thus estimated is V(Q) = -1540840 + 
5300Q – 4.612Q2 with Q in billions of cubic metres per year and V(.) in millions of US Dol-
lars, assuming the 2003 average oil price. The gross surplus function is negative for all Q 
and globally concave. One should note that this is not the profit function, but essentially 
profits minus payments for sold gas. Of course the results are not particularly robust given 
the small number of data points and the lack of a corroborating bottom-up approach. How-
ever the illustration suggests that Gazprom’s cost function could be locally concave in a 
range of production quantity of around 560 – 610 bcm per year. If this is the case, then the 
ISBP term from the model would be positive, and consolidating buying would be favourable 
for EU buyers of Russian gas. A more refined analysis of the possible shape and proper-
ties of V(Q) for the case of Gazprom would merit further research. 
 
Figure 3 
















We now assume that the quantities may differ. This could be explained by downstream 
market conditions, so that the gross surplus functions of the buyers depend not only on the 
quantities, but also on the tariffs obtained. A full treatment of this modification would require 
a re-specification of the model, with the insertion of a richer formulation for the gross sur-
plus functions. In this section we simplify the approach on the basis that the buyers con-
tinue, as in the original model, to maximise their total profit, so the core properties of the 
bargaining equilibria should be safeguarded. Three cases may be considered. The first is a 
voluntary equilibrium between buyers which allows for buyer consolidation if this is profit-
able, although the price effect may be positive or negative. The second is a forced equilib-
rium, imposed by public authorities in order to try to secure lower downstream prices for 
consumers and (since we are analysing natural gas imports) a lower energy import bill. 
This option would be activated by government(s) and/or EU institutions if there is a scope 
for import price reductions. The third case is a compromise, allowing voluntary buyer con-
solidation, but only if it leads to lower prices. The conditions for the respective cases are as 
follows: Voluntary consolidation: if DE + UE + ISBP > 0; Forced consolidation: if - DE + UE 
+ ISBP > 0; Compromise: if DE + UE + ISBP > 0 and - DE + UE + ISBP > 0. 
 
For the buyers, we assume that these are the EU Member States rather than individual 
companies. The typical EU gas company imports and distributes gas on its home market 
facing relatively weak competition. Stripping out the oil price effect, the rest of the cost 
structure is assumed to be locally quadratic and strongly convex in the short-run. This may 
be justified on the basis of the fixed nature of the infrastructure, implying a local cost-
minimising optimum which corresponds to the optimal flow rate through the available gas 
infrastructure. Conversely the gross surplus function is assumed to be locally quadratic and 
strongly concave. For simplicity we will assume a globally quadratic and concave gross 
surplus  function  for  the  buyers.  An  illustrative  calibration  is  attempted  using  Eurostat’s 
Structural Business Statistics (SBS)
19 in combination with gas import data from the IEA 
(volumes) and from Eurostat (values). Unfortunately the data situation is not favourable 
due to confidentiality restrictions, so that there are few countries for which the full set of 
variables can be obtained for more than one or two time periods. A holistic approach was 
therefore adopted, based on the case of Hungary. Only four observations were available 
which moreover do not strongly suggest a concave quadratic function. However the func-
tion was fitted anyway, choosing three of the four observations and computing the exact 
curve that passes through them. The results should therefore be interpreted only as an 
illustration, not as a fully-fledged calibration. 
A further justification for imposing a strongly concave surplus function (for the short-run) is 
to assume a dominant national gas company with limited access to alternative markets. 
The company would face steep losses if it over-contracts supplies as compared to down-
                                                            
19 Data for the sector: Distribution and trade of gaseous fuels through mains, NACE (rev. 1.1) 
code 4022. 52 
stream demand even by small amounts. Large losses on the increasing portion of the sur-










4. Numerical simulations 
The stylised gross surplus functions described earlier were used to generate a simplified 
numerical simulation of the possible effect of buyer coordination. The gross surplus func-
tion for Gazprom was taken as found. For the buyers it was assumed that there are 62 
similarly-sized buyers with gross supply functions based on randomised parameters in a 
range close to those found for the buyer function. Buyer coordination was simulated as 
follows. First, the separated equilibrium was simulated and the results stored. Second, for 
each successive non-overlapping pair of buyers, the optimisation was run again with the 
constraint that the price per unit obtained by the two coordinating buyers is equalised.  
For each pair there is always one winner and one loser in terms of the change in the price 
per unit compared to the separated equilibrium. However, in every case simulated, the new 
price is lower than the average unit price from the separated equilibrium. From the point of 
view of prices, therefore, forming an alliance is always favourable under the assumptions 
used. However in none of the simulated cases does an increase in the joint net surplus of 
the pair of buyers occur. Finally, in a majority of cases (26 out of 31), both buyers experi-
ence a loss in net surplus. These results suggest that the gains from consolidating pur-
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is always a loser in the alliance. And the typically negative changes in net surplus suggest 
that buyers will not have a private incentive to form alliances. The assumptions are how-
ever important. It was notably assumed that the supplier is in a monopoly position with 
respect to all the buyers (no outside option for any buyer) and, implicitly, that each buyer is 
a monopoly distributor on its own home market. This also means that exit (and indeed en-
try) is impossible. 
A second round of simulations was therefore carried out to account for the possibility of 
outside options for at least some of the buyers. This is in keeping with the current situation 
of EU gas importers. Some have access to more than one supplier, others do not. The 
simulation was therefore re-done, adding a constraint on one of the buyers that the pur-
chased volume must be below a fixed level, itself strictly smaller than the (monopoly) equi-
librium. Unsurprisingly the price falls, regardless of which buyer is chosen. The change in 
net surplus depends on the characteristics of the outside option and was not simulated. 
The more interesting case is now to combine outside option with buyer coalition by forming 
a coalition between a buyer that has an outside option and one that does not. An example 











B1      
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Volume 




Monopoly equilibrium  368  393  187.1  189.5  9.62  9.64  89321 
B1 outside option  n.c.  408  180.7  187.9  9.00  9.65  88331 
Outside option and alliance  n.c.  369  182.1  182.1  9.00  10.19  89090 




Two buyers are considered, B1 and B2, as well as the supplier S. The first case is the mo-
nopoly equilibrium, or separated equilibrium. Values are in millions of US dollars (assuming 
the 2003 oil price), prices in US dollars per thousand cubic metre, and volumes in billions 
of cubic metres. The second row shows what happens when buyer 1 is given (or forced to 
take) an outside option. This is affected by imposing a maximum purchase of 9 bcm, below 
the equilibrium volume of 9.62 bcm. In that case, the surplus of the supplier falls and the 
price falls for buyer 1 from 187.1 to 180.7. Note also that the surplus of buyer 2 rises and 
that his price falls: there has been a reduction in the competition for the same source of 
supply. The third row shows the effect of imposing an alliance between buyer 1 and buyer 
2 when buyer 1 is exercising a (partial) outside option. The joint price obtained by the alli-
ance is 182.1, higher for buyer 1, lower for buyer 2, as compared to the situation without 
the alliance. Also, the net surplus of buyer 2 falls – but the purchased volume rises. On the 54 
other hand the surplus of the supplier rises. This suggests that an alliance of buyers can be 
profitable to the supplier under certain conditions. Going beyond the model, the fall in the 
price for buyer 2 combined with the increase in volume is potentially profitable for the final 
customers of buyer 2 depending on downstream market conditions and regulation. 
The final case illustrates the effects of the alliance between the same buyers when there is 
no outside option. In this particular case net surplus falls for both buyers while it rises for 
the supplier. The joint price the buyers secure is in between the initial prices (slightly lower 
than the monopoly average price), implying that final customers could gain in one country 
but lose in the other. 
Taken together these results highlight some potential conclusions. First, the exercise of a 
partial outside option may be beneficial for the isolated buyers who remain and detrimental 
to the supplier. Such a partial option may be due to a government-imposed diversification 
policy, or to a voluntary commercial diversification, itself due to price considerations and/or 
to a rational risk diversification strategy. Second, buyer alliances do not necessarily lead to 
a higher surplus for either buyer, but can lead to a higher surplus for the supplier. The op-
posite outcome may also occur as shown in Chipty and Snyder (1999) but this was not 
apparent from the simulations made here. Last but not least, combining the imposition of 
an outside option with a buyer alliance can lead to lower prices for both buyers and to a 
loss of surplus for the supplier, though not necessarily to higher surpluses for either buyer. 
Moreover if one assumes that a buyer already exercises an outside option and is then 
forced to form an alliance with a second buyer who does not have such an option, then the 
price for the first buyer may rise while the price for the second buyer may fall and the sur-
plus of both buyers may fall. Lower prices, in turn, may or may not lead to welfare gains for 
final customers downstream. 
There are several relevant policy implications from these results. The first implication is that 
supplier diversification, even over a small share of supplies, can contribute very favourably 
to bargaining outcomes in terms of price. If downstream market conditions allow, then 
gains in consumer welfare seem possible as well. The second implication is that, if the 
buyers are entirely dependent on the same supplier, buyer alliances based on the principle 
of a single price (as opposed, e.g., to corporate mergers) may typically lead only to a mod-
erate fall in the average price, with some of the buyers facing higher prices than without the 
alliance. On the other hand, buyer alliances may bring interesting results if a buyer with a 
single source of supplies joins forces with a buyer who has more than one source of sup-
plies. In a sense, the advantages of diversification can be transmitted through alliances of 
buyers, thus helping to overcome the effects of monopoly power in isolated markets. 
 
5. Two questions for further research 
In Chipty and Snyder (1999), merged buyers increase their ‘bargaining position’ if the sur-
plus function of the supplier is concave. This is interpreted as the ability to obtain lower 
prices in Normann et al. (2007), in which a partial empirical validation of the model based 
on experimental data yields good results. While we take issue with the jump from the no-55 
tion of ‘bargaining position’ (as defined in Chipty and Snyder, 1999), to the actual ability to 
obtain lower prices, it is however clear that the shape of the cost function of the supplier 
plays an important role. Caldas Cabrera (2009) analyses the case for consolidating EU 
buyers of Russian gas on the basis of the possible shape of Gazprom’s cost function. This 
approach has major drawbacks as several key assumptions that underpin it are not met in 
practice. However the approach does deliver one particularly fascinating insight. Leaving 
aside Gazprom’s horizontal diversification (e.g. media ownership), and focusing only on the 
costs of gas production, the (remaining) cost function is the sum of the cost functions for 
each individual gas field. The insight is that if Gazprom were producing only from its large 
traditional fields, then its cost function would exhibit decreasing marginal costs, i.e. a con-
cave cost function. However the cost function should shift upwards as easier fields are 
depleted (Western Siberia) and production shifts to new and more challenging fields off-
shore  and  in  the  Arctic  region  (Shtokman  and  the  Yamal  Peninsula).  Caldas  Cabrera 
(2009)  concludes  that  the  decision  to  consolidate  EU  buyers  depends  on  ‘where  one 
stands’ on Gazprom’s cost curve. Of course, doing so with any accuracy is impossible 
without access to sensitive corporate data which is subject not only to commercial confi-
dentiality but also to state secrecy. However one idea for further research would be to ex-
plore plausible shapes and properties of this type of cost function. In that context, the goal 
would be to describe the properties of a cost function that is the sum over a distribution of 
natural gas fields. The gas fields are at different stages of maturity and each present differ-
ent challenges and cost profiles over time. The evolution of the total cost function over time 
would be an interesting research question, and one could explore how different scenarios 
concerning the phasing in of production at new fields affects the cost function. 
 
On a different level, the case of the Baltic States raises an interesting challenge to the 
model of Chipty and Snyder (1999). In the model the authors assume, implicitly, that the 
surplus functions of the buyers are independent from the surplus function of the seller. 
However Gazprom is a significant shareholder in the dominant Lithuanian gas company, 
Lietuvos Dujos, and in the Latvian monopolist gas company, Latvijas Gaze. Both compa-
nies are 34% owned by Gazprom . This implies that roughly a third of the profits in both 
cases accrue to the company that is their monopoly provider. A different specification of 
the model, allowing the simulation of cases where part of the surplus may flow back to the 
supplier,  could  hold  interesting  clues  for  the  (currently  shelved)  idea  of  the  European 
Commission back in September 2007 to introduce a ‘Gazprom clause’ into EU gas market 
legislation. Conversely, the case of E.ON Ruhrgas poses two further questions. It was (un-
til recently) a minority shareholder of Gazprom, so part of the surplus can flow back to a 
buyer. It is also a minority shareholder in the Baltic gas companies mentioned, so there 
can be (additional) surplus flows between buyers. In addition the supplier and one buyer 
may collude in modifying the bargaining stance of a third buyer. 
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6. Prospects and political support 
The recently adopted Communication of the Commission on the EU’s “Energy2020” strat-
egy, European Commission (2010d), is not very specific about the exact type of policy in-
strument that may be created, but the document makes clear that measures will be pro-
posed, see Box 1. The usual steps should therefore follow, namely a Commission proposal 
for a regulation or a directive, to be submitted to the European Parliament and then to the 




Selected extracts from the European Commission’s Energy2020 strategy  
 
 
New patterns of supply and demand in global energy markets and increasing competition for energy 
resources make it essential for the EU to be able to throw its combined market weight effectively in 
relations with key third-country energy partners. (…) 
 
The EU must now formalise the principle whereby Member States act in the benefit of the EU as a 
whole in bilateral energy relations with key partners and in global discussions. (…) 
 
Mechanisms will be proposed by the Commission to align existing international agreements (notably 
in the gas sector) with the internal market rules and to strengthen cooperation between Member 
States for the conclusion of new ones. (…) 
 
Supply issues, including network development and possibly grouped supply arrangements as well 




Source: European Commission (2010d), pp. 17-19. 
 
The EU’s Energy Commissioner, Günther Oettinger, had for his part also hinted at the 
forthcoming measures, e.g. when stating in January 2010 that “in future, energy supply 
contracts signed by individual member states with third countries would be replaced by 
European treaties”, see Euractiv (2010). The statement implies that an EU-wide approach 
would be mandatory, although the notions of ‘single price’ or ‘single buyer’ are not explicitly 
mentioned. Andoura et al. (2010) on the other hand were more specific, explicitly mention-
ing both the idea of gas purchasing consortia (presumably on a voluntary basis) and the 
idea of a gas purchasing agency. It is the latter analysis – which focuses more on the 
question of the legality of the proposal in light of EU competition law – which underpinned 
Jacques Delors’ intervention with Jerzy Buzek at the European Parliament. 
At the Member State level, support for the notion of a gas purchasing agency is particularly 
visible in Lithuania, with Parliamentary (Seimas) Speaker Irena Degutiene making a num-
ber of supportive interventions on the topic. As mentioned earlier the Lithuanian govern-57 
ment discovered that the country paid substantially more for Russian gas imports than 
Germany, a discrepancy which seems hard to justify save through an analysis of relative 
bargaining power and of outside options. The views of most other Member States are less 




Elements of reflection on the potential effects of consolidating the negotiating power of EU 
gas companies and Member States were developed, using the model of Chipty and Sny-
der (1999) as the basis for a theoretical discussion as well as for numerical illustrations. 
The latter were made based on very stylised surplus functions in order to represent Gaz-
prom on the one hand and fragmented EU gas importers on the other. Simulations were 
carried out in order to determine the effect of forcing pairs of buyers to ask for and apply a 
single (common) import price. The net surplus of the gas importing companies may rise or 
fall depending on the shape and properties of the surplus functions of the buyers and of the 
supplier. Moreover the net surplus of the supplier does not necessary fall. In terms of price 
effects, buyer alliances alone do not necessarily lead to a fall in price for all allied buyers, 
but they do bring a fall in the average price. Moreover, buyer alliances in combination with 
diversification of supply sources can lead to a fall in price for all alliance members. The 
positive effect of diversification experienced by one buyer can be de facto shared with buy-
ers with no diversification through the introduction of a buyer alliance. However it may be 
the case that the buyer who diversifies would be better off outside the alliance. 
A key question concerns the exact role of public policy in terms of coordinating (and com-
pensating) the interests of the various actors. If, as the simulations shown have suggested, 
there are cases where a buyer alliance could be profitable for consumers in an isolated 
market due to lower prices but cause a loss of surplus for one of the buyers (or even all of 
them),  then  policy  intervention  would  be  required.  It  would  not  be  sufficient  to  merely 
authorise alliances of buyers as they would not arise spontaneously. Instead it would be 
necessary to mandate buyer consolidation – for the benefit of consumers – and perhaps 
also to affect a partial compensation of the foregone profits for participating companies and 
their respective governments. The other important conclusion from the simulations is the 
critical role of diversification of supply sources, and the fact that part of the advantages of 
diversification can be, in effect, transmitted from a diversified market onto an isolated mar-
ket through an alliance of buyers. One conclusion is that legislation on a possible EU gas 
purchasing agency (and/or gas purchasing groups or consortia) should take into account 
the existing degree of diversification, and possibly encourage further diversification in spe-
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